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Thesis purpose: This thesis aims to explore how an organization configures its R&D 
openness and determine which role the factors of appropriability, competence level and 
culture play in this context. However, instead of considering R&D openness as one 
general concept, it is divided into four different types of openness. The objective of this 
study is to contribute in solving the literature gap of providing better insights on the 
different combinations of openness within a firm and how certain factors influence 
such a configuration. This will further academic understanding of a firm’s R&D 
openness decisions. 
Methodology: A case study design was applied as the authors conducted an internship 
at an organization (Bona). Through informal interviews, talks and observations within 
the company, and the conduct of a preliminary literature review, three influential open 
innovation factors were identified: appropriability, competence level and culture. 
Subsequent to this process, a literature review was conducted which was followed by 
the empirical data collection that was initiated through qualitative interviews with key 
persons within the R&D department of the case company. This allowed for in-depth 
insights into understanding why this firm settled for an R&D openness configuration – 
through the lens of the three factors. Thereafter, the empirical data was analyzed by 
comparing it with the concepts from the literature review – and a set of conclusions 
were drawn that have a degree of theoretical generalizability and may thus apply to a 
wider range of organizations than the case company alone. Consequently, this study 
aims to be a bridge between rich qualitative insights and deductive, quantitative follow-
up studies. 
Theoretical perspectives: The overarching concept within this thesis is Open 
Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003, Dahlander and Gann, 2010, Lichtenthaler, 2011) within 
an R&D setting (Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005; Enkel, 2009; Gassmann, 2010). It is 
specifically looked into how organizations can configure their R&D openness 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010) and how this configuration is influenced by factors like 
appropriability (Teece, 1986; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000; Dufresne and Offstein, 
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2008; Anderson, 2011), competence level (Drechsler and Natter, 2012; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Clausen, 2013; Berchicci, 2013; Lin, 2012; 
Schmidt, 2010, Barge-Gil, 2010) and culture (Herzog, 2011; Katz and Allen, 1982; 
Gilbert, 2005; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). 
Conclusions: The research indicated that organizations can display different 
configurations of R&D openness with regards to the different business areas or 
resource classes they deal with. Appropriability and competence level were found to 
have different influences on different types of R&D openness, and hence, are important 
factors in explaining the selected configuration. Additionally, it was found that culture 
is heavily impacted by these concepts – and it is proposed that this may be an 
exacerbating factor that may bias otherwise rational considerations when setting the 
configuration of R&D openness. The study has further developed academic 
understanding of how a firm’s R&D openness configuration is explained by the 
influences of appropriability, competence level and culture. In addition, several 
interesting areas for future research were identified also. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Closed innovation is a practice that proved to be a valuable strategic tool for most of 
the twentieth century (Chesbrough, 2003). Companies that applied this concept usually 
emphasized that organizations need strict control in order to successfully innovative 
and hence kept all organizational activities in-house (Chesbrough, 2003a; b). However, 
this isolation paradigm is believed to be outdated when it comes to today’s innovation 
management (Chesbrough, 2003). Due to the rise of the internet, communication 
technology has advanced substantially making not only market information more 
readily available but also facilitating market interaction (Knight and Cavusgil 1996; 
Aspelund and Moen 2005). As a result, information flows more freely and cheaply over 
the uncountable channels supplied by the internet and human resources are more 
widely dispersed as today’s technologies are more closely connected than ever before 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Another consequence of this fast paced business landscape can be 
observed in shorter product life cycles and windows of opportunities becoming 
increasingly smaller (Kuratko et. al, 2011). This has fueled increased global 
competition, where agility, flexibility and specialization are now the cornerstones of 
competitive advantage (Gassmann, 2008; Bughin, 2008).  
Consequently, Chesbrough (2003a) argues that firms need to become accustomed to the 
concept of OI (OI) by ‘accessing and exploiting outside knowledge, while liberating 
their own internal expertise for others’ use. OI can enhance an organization’s 
responsiveness towards the environment (Chesbrough, 1996) and allows systematic 
accessing of resources outside a firm’s boundaries (Hoffman, 2007).  
1.2 Problem discussion 
As the field of OI has enjoyed extensive attention during the past years, many aspects 
of the concept have already been investigated. Clausen (2013) for example examined 
the required organizational capabilities to engage in OI whereas Lazzarotti, Manzini 
and Pellegrini (2011) and Chesbrough and Garman (2009) considered different models 
for opening up the innovation process. Further, Kang and Kang (2009) investigated the 
relationships between the acquisition of external knowledge and performance of 
innovation. However, since the OI discussion is rather new, there are still areas that 
have not been addressed yet. While Dahlander and Gann (2010) identify the various 
types of OI in regards to inbound and outbound activities, they also voiced the need to 
further elaborate on the different combinations of openness within a firm. As this 
configuration can be assumed to be triggered by certain contextual factors, we will 
examine three factors that are believed to be of influential nature in regards to a firm’s 
types of openness.  
As an over-encompassing framework, a recent model by Dahlander and Gann (2010) is 
applied. In the course of their research the author duo identified four different types of 
openness that a firm can display simultaneously. However, the authors do not provide 
any prescriptive value by investigating factors that may influence the decision to settle 
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for a certain configuration. Next to this, a theoretical framework is built from academic 
literature, which is largely based on a model of Drechsler and Natter (2012) that is 
aimed at understanding a firm’s openness decisions. While their model mainly 
discusses “the underlying drivers of a firm’s degree of openness”, it does not 
distinguish between the different kinds of openness that Dahlander and Gann (2010) 
identified. Additionally, Drechsler and Natter (2012) do consider appropriability and 
competence level in their study, yet the notion of culture was neglected as an influential 
factor. However, as several authors have identified culture to be a crucial variable in 
explaining openness, it was decided to further include this element in our research 
(Katz and Allen, 1982; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Herzog, 2011). Further, since 
Drechsler and Natter (2012) used a quantitative approach to this matter, it is believed 
that qualitative insights will add additional understanding to the proposed relationships. 
Consequently, combining parts of these two frameworks is expected to enhance the 
understanding of a firm’s R&D openness decisions. For example, it could be that 
certain factors inhibit a particular type of openness, but this may not be influential in 
other areas. This would be very interesting for organizations to know since their 
situation may be ill-suited to engage in a particular type of openness, but they may be 
well-prepared for other forms of openness – and still reap benefits of OI.  
1.3 Research question 
Through informal interviews, observations and a preliminary literature review we 
identified three factors, appropriability, competence level and culture, to be of 
influential character when determining the openness configuration of an R&D 
department. As a result, the main data collection focused on these three elements and 
their relationship in regards to the four types of openness identified by Dahlander and 
Gann (2010). Based on a literature review and the provision of a brief background of 
the case company, the research question will lead through the various steps of this 
study. While firstly the “how” part of the R&D configuration will be answered by 
categorizing the firm’s OI activities according to the identified four OI types, 
subsequently the “how” character of the factors of appropriability, competence level 
and culture will be addressed.  
Consequently, the resulting research question reads as follows:  
How does a firm configure its R&D openness and how is this influenced by the factors 
of appropriability, competence level and culture? 
1.4 Purpose 
Conducting a six months internship within an organization provided the thesis authors 
with a unique opportunity to examine a phenomenon in-depth and understand its 
underlying contextual determinants. This describes the objective of this thesis rather 
well: to add understanding of the configuration of R&D openness by investigating how 
a set of contextual factors (competence level, appropriability, culture) influence such 
decisions. Therefore, a case study design was picked as this research method may 
provide ‘rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon’ 
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(Eisenhardt, 2007). The inductive element of this research design allows filling of the 
aforementioned gap by extending institutional theory. Additionally, Morrison (2000) 
argues that culture is complex, amorphous, ethereal and multi-layered – ‘the ability of 
qualitative data to explicate the complex social process involved’ is another reason why 
a case study design lends itself perfectly to investigate the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 
2007). Through looking into a particular case, new theory may be built; the case study 
may then be ‘a bridge from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research’ 
(Eisenhardt, 2007). Overall, this research will not only add to literature because it 
addresses an issue that has been voiced as an interesting avenue for further research, 
but also because it further builds upon existing studies by combining different areas 
(types of R&D openness with contextual factors) in a way that, to the author’s 
knowledge, has not been done before. While this research aims to fill this gap, it may 
also add knowledge in regards to a practical point of view as a better understanding of a 
firm’s effective management of R&D openness may be gained.  
Even though the generalizability of this study is limited, some findings may still prove 
to be of use to firms that operate in a similar environment. The subject of investigation 
for this thesis is a Swedish chemical and coatings producer, called Bona. As the 
company is heavily dependent on its R&D practices to differentiate its offering from 
competitors, it is strongly committed to innovation practices. Since Bona management 
is very interested in OI, they have made conscious decisions about the openness 
configuration of their R&D practices. Consequently, this case study provides a solid 
foundation to investigate decisions with regards to R&D openness. 
1.5 Key concepts 
The overarching topic of this thesis is OI, defined by Chesbrough (2003a) as ‘accessing 
and exploiting outside knowledge while liberating own internal expertise for others’ 
use.’ This topic is broadly considered in the literature review as to get a clear 
understanding of this wide phenomenon. Subsequently, the various types of R&D 
openness that a company can engage in simultaneously are considered according to the 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) model, which is supplemented with additional academic 
literature. In order to understand and explain the R&D openness configuration, three 
concepts will be examined in this context: appropriability, competence level and 
culture. Each of these factors are explained individually and founded in academic 
literature. To provide an initial understanding of these concepts a brief introduction to 
each concept will be given: appropriability is an important issue as firms that engage in 
value creation activities also need to apply mechanisms that capture the respective 
value created, because otherwise commercial success is impaired (Fischer and Henkel, 
2012; Teece, 1986). Further, competence level of an R&D department was included as 
it may be a strong influential factor on the degree of openness, since firms with strong 
in-house R&D capabilities were found to be better positioned to absorb information 
from the external environment (Lin, 2012; Hagedoorn, 2012; Caloghirou, 2004; 
Berchicci, 2013). Finally, as Herzog (2011) proposes, ‘the move from closed 
innovation to OI needs to be accompanied by a change in the underlying culture.’ An 
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organizational shortcoming known as the ‘not-invented-here syndrome’ and its 
counterpart the ‘not-sold-here syndrome’ may severely inhibit OI practices (Katz and 
Allen, 1982; Herzog, 2011). 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Overview of the phenomenon 
This paragraph serves as a general introduction to the phenomenon that is labeled 
‘Open Innovation’ in academic literature. According to Chesbrough (2003a), internal 
R&D capabilities were a strategic asset, based on the assumption that successful 
innovation requires control. In order to maintain such control, organizations adhered to 
a closed innovation philosophy that “embraces a strategy of vertical integration and 
exclusive control”, an approach that according to Chesbrough (2003a), worked well for 
most of the twentieth century. 
However, substantial advancements in communication technology has not only made 
market information more readily available, but also facilitated market interaction 
(Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Aspelund and Moen, 2005). As a result, information flows 
more freely and cheaply over the uncountable channels supplied by the internet, and 
widely dispersed human resources are more accessible than ever due to connectedness 
(Chesbrough, 2003a). Increased global competition has infused agility, flexibility and 
specialization practices as the contemporary fundaments of competitive advantage 
(Gassmann, 2006; Bughin, 2008).  
The change towards a global economy implies that specialized organizations can now 
serve international markets: the dynamics of several high-tech markets are altered as 
small, flexible specialist companies challenge large, generalist competitors (Iansiti, 
1997), increasing the pool of competitors. This more dynamic, competitive, fast-paced 
business landscape can be observed in shorter product life cycles and windows of 
opportunities becoming increasingly smaller (Kuratko et. al, 2011). 
Consequently, responsiveness is an indispensable quality in order to survive in this new 
global economy (Gassmann, 2006). As a final product may incorporate technology 
from a variety of fields, it is a misconception to expect that organizations can master all 
activities, and achieve competitive superiority in each link (Iansiti, 1997). The main 
fallacy of the closed innovation principle is an organization’s belief that it controls the 
best resources in its respective field (Chesbrough, 2003a). Even if organizations would 
achieve a specialized level in all of its business activities, the organization would grow 
excessively large, which in turn would exacerbate bureaucracy and impair 
responsiveness to the market (Greiner, 1998; Chesbrough, 1996). Therefore, Sampson 
(2007) argues that the enhanced responsiveness of small external actors needs to be 
injected into bigger organizations.  
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In order to prosper, Chesbrough argues that firms need to become accustomed to the 
concept of OI: “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate 
internal innovation, and to expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively” (Van de Vrande, 2009). This implies that organizations cooperate with, 
and benefit from, ‘sourcing external ideas and knowledge from suppliers, customers, 
competitors, consultants, universities and public research organizations’ (Dahlander 
and Gann, 2010). As the R&D departments of many organizations are the ‘innovation 
hubs’ of the firm, much of the academic literature interchangeably talks about OI and 
open R&D (Chesbrough, 2003a; b; Enkel, 2009; Gassmann, 2010). Fey and Birkinshaw 
(2005) recognize that R&D settings may be most suitable for OI research, as ‘R&D 
departments rely to a greater degree than most departments on new sources of 
knowledge on an ongoing basis. Because innovation primarily occurs through new 
combinations of resources, a fertile R&D environment relies on a constant inflow of 
knowledge from other places.’  
Through OI, companies can benefit from increased responsiveness towards the 
environment, but also avoid their own bureaucracy (Chesbrough, 1996). Additionally, 
OI practices allow organizations to systematically access resources outside a firm’s 
boundaries (Hoffman, 2007), which may ‘deepen the pool of technological 
opportunities’ (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This is in line with Iansiti’s (1997) findings 
stating that it is virtually impossible for organizations to acquire the status of core 
competence in all of its activities. Consequently, OI allows an organization to tap into 
the relative strengths of other players in the market. As Brez (2009) proposes, ‘OI 
brings to light creative ideas and dramatically expands the innovation network outside 
of the usual experience base.’ Further, Keupp (2009) proposes that organizations are 
generally better at exploitation of their current competitive advantage than at 
exploration behavior to detect future competitive advantages. Organizations need 
formalization, low complexity and high centralization in order to exploit their current 
competitive advantage to the fullest and ensure organizational continuity in every-day 
practices. However, exploration requires conditions of low formalization and low 
centralization, which organizations find hard to handle within their bureaucratic 
machines (Kuratko et al. 2011; Datta, 2011). Hence, organizations can use OI 
initiatives as a tool for exploratory activities.  
As Lichtenthaler (2011) reports, organizations in many industries show a tendency 
towards acquiring external technologies to complement their in-house competence pool 
– this is the most common view of OI. Organizations may solely engage in such 
inbound OI, but they may also engage in outbound OI. Outbound OI is more concerned 
with external commercialization or exploitation of in-house inventions (Huizingh, 
2011; Lichtenthaler, 2011). In this instance, organizations may ‘attempt to sell ideas 
and resources in the market place’ (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). As McGrath and Keil 
(2007) propose, firms may sell or license out inventions if they prove no strategic fit for 
the selling organization, which facilitates a solution to still extract value out of an 
invention.  
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Next to a series of benefits, the concept of OI is subject to organizational risks as well. 
As Chesbrough (1996) proposes, distributing responsibility for innovation also lowers 
the degree of control over the process – coordination failures may evaporate innovation 
efforts. Keupp (2009) and Christensen (2005) argue that OI practices may be subject to 
considerable transaction costs as many external actors may be involved. Research by 
Laursen and Salter (2006) demonstrated that innovation search may be time 
consuming, expensive and arduous. They observed an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the number of external sources applied in innovation and innovation 
performance – too little or too many external parties may negatively impact innovative 
performance. Another risk of relying too heavily on external actors to perform 
innovation for you is that organizations develop as hollow entities (Chesbrough, 1996). 
They have coordination capabilities as a core competence, but fail to develop strong 
internal capabilities and are subject to strategic hazards, especially if cooperation with 
external actors becomes problematic or ceases (Chesbrough, 1996; Windahl, 2006; 
Davies, 2007; Matthyssens, 2008).  
Perhaps the biggest risk of OI is related to appropriability: organizations need to make 
sure that they can capture the rents from dispersed technological development, because 
otherwise there is no value in cooperatively realizing inventions – external parties can 
even steal innovations or ‘free-ride’ on the innovator’s investments by using the 
innovation in their business (Teece, 1986; Helfat, 2006; West, 2006; Lieberman, 1988). 
Since this matter is of influential power when it comes to engaging in OI activities, it 
will be discussed more in detail later on in this thesis. 
2.2 Types and configuration of R&D openness 
When discussing the configuration of R&D openness, it has to be considered that 
openness ‘is not a binary classification of open versus closed’ (Chesbrough, 2003a). To 
the contrary, a firm’s openness is distributed between internal and external innovation 
strategies, which can be located along a continuum ranging from closed to open 
(Drechsler and Natter, 2012; Huizingh, 2012; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). A firm’s 
position on this openness continuum is not rigid, as some parts of the innovation 
activity are open while others are closed (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Enkel et al., 2009). 
Several authors have proposed different models to captivate the configuration of 
openness. Pisano and Verganti (2008) propose a model with four different 
collaboration modes: the desired choice of openness depends on ‘how open or closed 
membership in a collaborative network should be – and how flat or hierarchical the 
collaborative governance structure should be.’ In contrast Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler (2009) classify openness by relating internal/external knowledge flows to 
absorptive capacity, dynamic capabilities and knowledge management. Another model 
is proposed by Chesbrough (2003a) in which the innovation outcome is linked to the 
innovation process; both dimensions range from closed to open. In this thesis, the 
model proposed by Dahlander and Gann (2010) is applied to classify the types of 
openness and thus determine the configuration. The authors conducted a thorough 
literature research amongst a 150 scientific publications with regards to OI - and 
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grouped the types of openness they observed. Based on this, a composite framework 
was established with four areas through which organizations can display different types 
of openness simultaneously. This framework is relatively recent (2010), is well-
founded on earlier literature and the four factors provide a reasonable research load 
considering constraints in time. This model is elaborated on in further detail in the next 
paragraph.  
2.3 R&D openness: a configuration model 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) developed a model that consists of four different types of 
openness. Each type is shortly elaborated on in this paragraph. This is important in 
answering the first part of the research question ‘How does a firm configure its R&D 
openness and how is this influenced by the factors of appropriability, competence level 
and culture?’ 
2.3.1 Inbound innovation: sourcing 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) define sourcing as the degree to which organizations 
utilize external sources of innovation. It is about ‘leveraging the discoveries of others’ 
– and does not include payment as the primary tool to acquire knowledge. As 
Chesbrough (2003a) argued, not all smart people work in one company; organizations 
can access resources through external networks (Datta, 2010). ‘Firms that manage to 
create a synergy between their own processes and externally available ideas may be 
able to benefit from the creative ideas of outsiders to generate profitable new products’ 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010). Sourcing may allow organizations to become more 
responsive to the environment (Chesbrough, 1996) and allows ‘firms to complement 
internal R&D with external initiatives to increase returns on innovation, which allows 
mature organizations to capture the strategic value of emerging technology and 
entrepreneurial ventures’ (Battistini, 2013; Hoffman, 2007). It allows firms to tap into 
the relative strengths of others (Iansiti, 1997). Next to the prevailing view of OI 
research focusing on businesses and associations, collaboration with customers may be 
an important source of external input into innovation practices as well. Differentiation 
is increasingly dependent on depicting customers as the epicenter of doing business, 
and hence, involving customers generates more market-driven innovation (Vaisnore 
and Petraite, 2011; Vargo, 2004). Customers can play a role in different stages of the 
innovation model, for example, in idea generation, development and product 
commercialization (Vaisnore and Petraite, 2011). Such customer involvement is found 
to be significantly correlated with higher levels of innovative sales (Laursen, 2011).  
2.3.2 Inbound innovation: acquiring 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) define this type of openness as ‘acquiring input to the 
innovation process through the market place; licensing in and acquiring outside 
expertise.’ Although both types of inbound innovation have a very high degree of 
similarity, there is one main difference: this transaction involves money. Hence, instead 
of R&D cooperations in which both parties contribute with knowledge resources, the 
company that acquires technology pays for it with financial resources – and may get 
full ownership of the invention.  
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2.3.3 Outbound innovation: revealing 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) propose that organizations can reveal their resources to the 
external environment for indirect benefits: as OI practices are usually transactions, 
organizations need a ‘currency’ in order to realize inbound innovation. As Henkel 
(2006) found, organizations can selectively reveal innovations in order to get 
developmental support from external players – the revealing organization basically gets 
resources in return. Dahlander and Gann (2010) also propose that organizations may 
gather legitimacy from the external environment for their innovation – by assessing 
how the external environment responds to it. Next to this, this innovation type can give 
an industry the ‘ability to build upon each other’s work which may result in a steady 
stream of incremental innovation across the community of firms’. This is especially 
valuable in cases in which ‘the innovation provided by one firm makes the product 
invented by another firm more valuable’ (Levin, 1987), for example, through a bigger 
installed base of users (Schilling, 2010). Dominant design adoption, defined as a 
market’s acceptance of a standard product design architecture that defines the product 
category (Srinivasan, 2006; Tegarden, 1999) may also be speeded up through 
selectively revealing resources to lure competitors into adopting a company’s design.  
2.3.4 Outbound innovation: selling 
As Dahlander and Gann (2010) propose, this type of OI refers to “how firms 
commercialize their inventions and technologies through selling or licensing out 
resources.” McGrath and Keil (2007) argue that technologies that prove no good fit 
with the firm’s strategy may be interesting to organizations that possess the 
infrastructure to turn it into a success. Teece (1986), Helfat (2006) and Fosfuri (2006) 
indeed propose that other parties may have a better organizational set-up and 
commercialization capabilities to fully exploit the technology and hence may be 
interested in such intellectual property. The selling firm then gets financial resources 
for it and in this manner further exploits its potential by extracting value out of its non-
marketed resources (Chesbrough, 2003a). As Lichtenthaler (2005) found, there are 
major imperfections in knowledge markets that create opportunities for organizations to 
commercialize their ‘excess’ innovations. This is a growing trend and some pioneers in 
this field, like IBM, ‘realize annual licensing revenues of more than one billion US 
dollars.’ However, selling technology is a complex endeavor and ‘extracting revenues 
from the sale of technology remains a challenge for most firms’ (Bianchi, 2011; 
Lichtenthaler, 2005). Lichtenthaler (2005) suggests that it is hard to sell technological 
resources as they are intangible, idiosyncratic, have uncertain cash-generation potential 
and have poorly defined property rights. Additionally, the predominantly tacit nature of 
technology resides in individuals and is difficult to articulate and to transfer.  
2.4 Theoretical model: factors influencing the configuration of R&D openness 
A theoretical model is compiled to examine the second section of the main research 
question ‘How does a firm configure its R&D openness and how is this influenced by 
the factors of appropriability, competence level and culture?’ Based on an extensive 
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literature review, three areas are identified that may explain the configuration of R&D 
openness. Each of these areas is presented and elaborated on in this paragraph.  
2.4.1 Competence level 
Having high competence levels is a powerful organizational ability and is believed to 
be of influential character when it comes to OI activities. Firstly, as Drechsler and 
Natter (2012) found, companies with high competence levels are regarded as more 
attractive partners when it comes to knowledge sharing or other collaboration works. 
Further, the competence level of an R&D department is strongly related to the concept 
of ‘absorptive capacity’, which is ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, 
external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends, which is critical to 
its innovative capabilities.’ This is largely a function of the firm’s level of prior 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Hence, the higher the competence level of an 
R&D department, the better suited it is to make sense of external knowledge that flows 
into the company, indicating strong absorptive capacity. Zahra and George (2002) 
provide a similar definition by dividing absorptive capacity into two different groups: 
potential absorptive capacity and realized absorptive capacity. While the former 
includes knowledge acquisition and assimilation, the latter is a function of transforming 
and exploiting the acquired knowledge. “Acquisition” ‘refers to a firm’s capability to 
identify and acquire externally generated knowledge that is critical to its operations’, 
which mainly relates to partner identification (Zahra and George, 2002). Lin (2012) 
found that partner selection is essential since R&D alliances were most successful if the 
technological distance between the actors was moderate. A small difference would 
create a substitutive effect, whilst large differences may be beyond the firm’s 
absorptive capacities. In addition, Clausen (2013) found that internal R&D, training 
and an educated workforce are core aspects of a firm’s absorptive capacity. 
Assimilation is the next step in the absorptive capacity chain and is defined as “the 
firm's routines and processes that allow it to analyze, process, interpret, and understand 
the information obtained from external sources” (Kim, 1997a,b; Szulanski, 1996; Zahra 
and George, 2002) which is followed by the “transformation” that is characterized by 
internalizing and converting the foreign knowledge to the firm’s existing structures 
(Zahra and George, 2002). The final step of absorbing external resources is represented 
by “exploitation”. As acquiring, assimilating and transforming all portray time-
consuming and costly processes, this last stage is characterized by harvesting and 
benefiting from the attained knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002). Both forms of 
absorptive capacity, potential and realized, have “separate but complementary roles that 
co-exist at all times” (Zahra and George, 2002). In other words, firms can be good at 
transforming knowledge, yet this does not necessarily mean that they are good at 
acquiring knowledge. Consequently, firms have to be adept at all four absorptive 
capacity stages in order to capitalize on external resources. 
Many studies have proven that if organizations build strong in-house R&D capabilities, 
they are better positioned to absorb information from the external environment, (Lin, 
2012; Hagedoorn, 2012; Caloghirou, 2004; Berchicci, 2013). Hence, R&D intensity is 
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often employed as the parameter to determine an organization’s in-house R&D 
capabilities (Lin, 2012; Hagedoorn, 2012). Schmidt (2010), however, found that 
absorptive capacity is cumulative and that continuous R&D activities are far more 
significant in building absorptive capacity. Therefore, absorptive capacity is history and 
path dependent (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Further, an informal, knowledge-sharing 
culture and a highly skilled labor force proved to be significant in building absorptive 
capacity (Schmidt, 2010).  
Hagedoorn (2012) indicated that firms with weak in-house R&D capabilities risk a 
substitutive effect when engaging in external R&D; at the other end of the continuum, 
Berchicci (2013) found that after a certain threshold, companies risk a substitution 
effect also which is even stronger for organizations with high R&D capabilities. 
Laursen and Salter (2006) observed such relationships as they found an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the number of external sources and innovation 
performance indicating that too little or too many external actors may negatively 
impact innovation performance. Barge-Gil (2010) found that firms with strong R&D 
capabilities have ‘great capacity to absorb external knowledge, but their need for it is 
usually smaller’. As a result, they exploit it ‘but it is not at the core of their innovation 
assets’ (Barge-Gil, 2010).  
Consequently, considering the above findings it can be assumed that a firm’s 
competence level will have an effect on a firm’s attitude towards OI activities.  
2.4.2 Appropriability 
Fischer and Henkel (2012) recognize that firms engaging in value creation activities 
also need to apply mechanisms that capture the respective value created as otherwise, 
commercial success is impaired. In other words, the firm is confronted with various 
threats with regards to capturing the value that they created by moving R&D activities 
beyond company walls (Teece, 1986). As Drechsler and Natter (2012) found, the 
higher the perceived effectiveness of IP protection, the more likely firms are to engage 
in OI. Research by Li and Xie (2011) indicated a similar relation as they found firms to 
prefer “setting up wholly-owned and closed R&D labs in regions with poor IP 
protection, and cooperative ventures where protection was more robust.’ Hence, the 
risk of external players taking a disproportionate share of the generated value appears 
to be an important inhibitor of open R&D (Li and Xie, 2011). 
As a means to protect intellectual property during OI practices, organizations can 
consider filing a patent. Patents grant an innovator the exclusive user right for the 
particular innovation for a fixed time span. According to Fischer and Henkel (2012) 
“the classic purpose of patents is to prevent imitation through blocking competitors.” 
Patents, however, are also used to facilitate technology selling or licensing (Fischer and 
Henkel, 2012). Through a patent, the patent-holder can claim ownership of an invention 
and be the only economic beneficiary of it. However, patenting also has clear 
downsides. Filing a patent requires the organization to disclose the composition of its 
innovation (Erkal, 2005), which ‘should contain sufficient information to allow a 
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skilled person to reproduce the particular innovation (Kultti, 2007). Innovators may 
fear that the information that is revealed may be used to the benefit of competitors 
(Zhang, 2012). As patent protection is usually imperfect, organizations also fear that 
patents will educate competitors so that they can find ways to legally invent around the 
patent (Arundel, 2001; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). Such practices may allow 
duplication of a firm’s competitive advantage. Next to this, Dufresne and Offstein 
(2008) claim that ‘maintaining, guarding, controlling, and even mainstreaming patents 
all require an investment – financially, politically and socially.’ Hence, apart from 
having to disclose possibly sensitive information in a patent, organizations also need to 
incur costs to police a patent – infringement needs to be proven and then the offender 
needs to be sued for any damages. A way to prove patent infringement is through 
reverse-engineering, defined as ‘deconstructing a unit and analyzing it in detail, so that 
the original can be duplicated (Minagawa, 2007; Denicolo and Franzoni, 2004). 
Through such activities, it can be determined whether a competitor is in violation. 
Since this is often a time-consuming and costly endeavor a study by Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh (2000) indicated that in many industries, secrecy is the key and most widely 
employed appropriation mechanism - especially within the chemical industry in regards 
to process innovations. However, the authors also indicate that “of all the 
appropriability mechanisms, secrecy lends itself the least to R&D spillovers” rendering 
OI impossible. Organizations that operate under a secrecy policy enjoy no legal 
protection (Anderson, 2011). Hence, a company’s secrets may be revealed through 
independent innovation of competing firms, but also through reverse-engineering. A 
secrecy policy provides no legal barrier for organizations to adopt the ‘secret’ within 
their business practices – second inventors may even patent ‘their’ invention and 
prevent the original inventor from using the invention in its business. Hence, Kultti 
(2007) and Amara (2008) propose that organizations need to estimate the probability 
that certain technologies may be imitated by competitors in the short-run, and protect 
these with patents, whilst secrecy may protect innovations that are not expected to be 
copied within shorter time frames.  
Despite this large disadvantage, secrecy has considerable advantages over patenting as 
well (Anderson, 2011). Secrecy can provide firms with a potentially limitless lifespan, 
whilst patents only last a certain time. Second, a secrecy regime requires no costly legal 
formalities that characterize patents. Finally, secrets require no broad disclosure, 
because widely known information cannot qualify as a ‘secret’. As Lane and Wegner 
(1995) propose, ‘secrecy is a form of intentional deception or an act of deceptive 
omission.’ As opposed to this, patenting requires aforementioned disclose of possibly 
sensitive information.  
Concluding, it can be said that appropriability with its different mechanisms of 
capturing the value created by an organization, is very likely to have an influence on a 
firm’s OI configurations. 
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2.4.3 Culture 
Organizational culture can be defined as ‘a collection of values, beliefs and norms 
shared by its members and reflected in organizational practices and goals’ (Hofstede et 
al., 1990; Khazanchi et al., 2007). Culture “transcends every aspect of an organization”. 
It is to a large extent an outcome of a firm’s historical and current operations. Cultures 
can be deeply rooted, which makes them not easily changeable (Kuratko, 2011). In a 
company context, culture has been found to be a bilateral concept as it was found to be 
of contributing nature to the occurrence of innovation, but also acted as an inhibitor 
(Khazanchi et al., 2007; Martins and Terblanche; Ahmed, 1998). As Herzog (2011) 
proposes, ‘the move from closed innovation to OI needs to be accompanied by a 
change in the underlying innovation culture.’ In order to create an OI culture, 
organizations need to avoid that their culture is falling victim to the ‘not invented-here 
syndrome’ (NIH-syndrome). Originally termed by Katz and Allen (1982), NIH-
syndrome is defined as the “tendency of a project group of stable composition to 
believe it possesses a monopoly of knowledge in its field, which leads it to reject new 
ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment of its performance.” Their research 
indicated that communication with external actors gradually decreases as the tenure of 
staff increases. Laursen and Salter (2006) also argue that ‘the greater attention to 
openness for external sources confronts internal resistance from technical staff.’ 
Further, Veugelers (1999) examined NIH syndrome amongst Belgian manufacturing 
firms and found that organizations suffering from this phenomenon were significantly 
less likely to engage in OI. Other studies found empirical support for such a syndrome 
as well (Mehrwald, 1999; Di Minin et al., 2010; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). 
Based on a thorough literature research, Herzog (2011) identifies several other 
antecedents of NIH-syndrome. At first, resistance to sourcing innovation may occur as 
staff perceives it as violation of their own identity. For example, R&D scientists may 
resist sourcing innovation as they want to focus on technical discoveries, instead of 
integrating external technologies (Slowinski et al., 2009). Additionally, Herzog (2011) 
proposes that individuals aim to create a stable working environment (routines) which 
leads to stress and uncertainty reduction. As no experiences at all with technology 
sourcing may create uncertainty, a negative bias towards OI can arise (Herzog, 2011). 
Finally, on an organizational level, OI cultures require a higher degree of risk tolerance 
than is necessary for closed regimes. Mehrwald (1999) also found a number of factors 
that correspond with the aforementioned antecedents of NIH-syndrome: ‘the degree of 
trust in one’s own technological competence and the relative performance of external 
technology.’ Gilbert (2005), Chesbrough and Crowther (2006) argue that the absence of 
a strong perception of threat or a clear articulation of the necessity to be open is fueling 
NIH-syndrome as well.  
Opposed to NIH-syndrome, which is mainly concerned with inbound innovation, there 
is also a counterpart to this phenomenon referred to as the ‘not-sold-here’ syndrome 
(NSH-syndrome). According to Herzog (2011), the antecedents are equivalent to NIH-
syndrome, but the main reason for the NSH-syndrome is different. It constitutes the 
fear that competitors will strengthen their relative position by further building upon the 
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technology provided by the selling organization. It is a ‘systematic overestimation’ of 
negative outcomes of selling technology – emotional appeals influence normally 
rational economic considerations (Herzog, 2011). 
Concluding, culture and in particular the concepts of NIH and NSH appear to 
substantially influence a firm’s openness set-up. 
2.5 Merging models into a research paradigm 
The main research question that guides this study reads as following: ‘How does a firm 
configure its R&D openness and how is this influenced by the factors of 
appropriability, competence level and culture?’ This will be done by investigating the 
four different OI innovation types in regards to the influential character of the above 
discussed three contextual factors of appropriability, competence level and culture.  
In order to visualize our approach, our corresponding conceptual model is provided 
below: 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Purpose and background 
As the thesis authors conducted an internship within an organization for six months, a 
unique opportunity emerged to delve into a phenomenon in an in-depth manner and 
understand the contextual factors surrounding it. Consequently, a research question that 
allows for such an investigation was selected: to add understanding of the configuration 
of R&D openness by trying to understand the ‘contextual factors’ (competence level, 
appropriability, OI culture) that influence such decisions.  
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3.2 Research philosophy 
The research philosophy ‘has importance implications about the way in which the 
researcher views the world. These assumptions will underpin a research strategy and 
the methods that are selected as part of that strategy’ (Saunders, 2007). This thesis aims 
to explain the decisions that an organization makes with regards to the configuration of 
its R&D openness – which are influenced by the interplay of contextual factors. In the 
course of this research the following stance is adopted stating that “the social world of 
business and management is far too complex to lend itself to theorizing by definite laws 
in the same way as the physical sciences, because rich insights into this complex world 
are lost if such complexity is reduced entirely to a series of law-like generalization” 
(Saunders, 2007). At the same time, it is tried to allow the outcomes of this thesis to 
claim a degree of theoretical generalizability (Bryman, 2007) so that it forms a bridge 
for quantitative follow-up research to make law-like inferences from (Eisenhardt, 
2007). Based on the field of epistemology, a position in between positivism (laws) and 
interpretivism (every situation is unique) is occupied: critical realism relates to 
scientific enquiry, but also points out that researchers must understand the social 
structures (context) that have enabled a phenomenon to unfold, if a complete 
understanding of the social world is desired (Bhaskar, 1989; Saunders, 2007).  
3.3 Research approach 
While in the course of the thesis it is regularly switched between induction and 
deduction, the ultimate aim is to build new theory from observations within the 
organization (Saunders, 2007). Hence, the final set-up of the thesis will be of inductive 
nature. However, the researchers do not intent to build new theory without considering 
what has already been reported on in academic literature; consequently the application 
of theoretical models plays a large role as well. The initial stages of the research project 
are strongly influenced by observations, talks, preliminary interviews and academic 
literature to build a theoretical model, which mainly follows an inductive logic. The 
influence of this theoretical model on the organization’s R&D openness configuration 
is then tested by engaging in the official data collection round, which shows signs of 
theory-testing, thus, this resembles a deductive approach as well (Saunders, 2007). 
These findings are then compared to the theoretical framework in order to generate new 
theory, which will manifest the final inductive character of this thesis.  
3.4 Research strategy 
In line with the philosophy of ‘critical realism’, qualitative research methods are 
employed as they lend themselves best to explore the complexity of the social world 
within an organization (Saunders, 2007). Qualitative research methods are 
characterized by their richness and fullness in studying a phenomenon, which make 
them very appropriate in order to get deep insights into a phenomenon, and to 
understand the contextual factors influencing it (Bryman, 2007; Saunders, 2007; from 
Robson, 2002) portraying the aim of this thesis. Additionally, the inductive approach 
requires some flexibility to iterate between different stages of the research. Qualitative 
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methods are most appropriate in this as they are ‘not hindered by the rigorous and rigid 
methodology of quantitative methods that ban out any flexibility’ (Saunders, 2007).  
As a research strategy, the case study design is applied, which facilitates an in-depth 
examination of a phenomenon occurring within a single entity, in this instance an 
organization (Bryman, 2007) thus, a case study accommodates a qualitative research 
design very well (Bryman, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2007). Through immersion within an 
organization, a more in-depth view can be created than a quantitative survey would 
allow. Perry (1998) found that a case study is most suitable to a researcher following a 
research philosophy of critical realism, which is the chosen approach of this thesis. 
Eventually, a well-executed case study may be a strong bridge from qualitative 
evidence towards deductive research (Eisenhardt, 2007), which constitutes the final 
objective of this study. 
3.5 Research process 
The research process strongly aligns with the model by Eisenhardt (1989) about 
building theory from cases, but also with the model by Bryman (2007) about 
conducting qualitative research in general. At first, already based on unofficial 
observations within the case company, a preliminary research question was formulated. 
Subsequently, a thorough literature review was conducted to serve as a theoretical 
frame of reference. After this, a process of selecting data collection tools, and the actual 
collection of empirical data commenced. Next, the empirical data were analyzed and 
compared to the theoretical frame of reference to see where comparison or conflicts 
occur – which allows the findings to be benchmarked against, but also positioned 
within existing academic literature. Then, conclusions are shaped that may provide a 
bridge from qualitative data towards deductive testing. As aforementioned, the 
collection and analysis of qualitative data is an iterative process (Bryman and Bell, 
2007), which means the research switches between data collection and data analysis 
during its life cycle, in which the research question is also further narrowed down or 
additional academic literature is looked into. Additionally, preliminary work within the 
case company also facilitated the discovery and pinpointing of the most interesting 
features of the case, defined as an idiographic approach (Bryman and Bell, 2007) – in 
this way we identified appropriability, competence level and culture to be essential 
elements in a department’s openness configuration.  
3.6 Data collection 
Within the spectrum of qualitative data collection tools, semi-structured interviews 
were applied to collect empirical data. Semi-structured interviews ensure that the 
respondent answers questions in each area of interest (interview guide see appendix I), 
while the flexibility is maintained to follow-up on interesting findings and thus to 
understand the reason of the response (Saunders, 2007). When considering the role of 
the interviewer, the best practices (Saunders, 2007) with regards to certain factors are 
applied to minimize biased responses: solid preparation, demonstrable knowledge as 
interviewer, appropriateness of location, appearance, interview introduction, unbiased 
questioning, appropriate behavior, attentive listening skills, data recording/note-taking 
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and cultural differences are all points of attention for administering the interviews. One 
of the interviewers is partially a note-taker and partially a second interviewer in case 
he/she detects something interesting; the other interviewer is solely focused on 
conducting the interview and oversees the broader picture – all interviews were audio-
recorded.  
3.7 Sample selection 
As frequently used for a qualitative case study design, a purposive non-probability 
sample was chosen: by using judgment, expert interviewees were selected that were 
believed to be most suitable to provide answers to our research question. This, in turn, 
raises the reliability power of the empirical findings (Saunders, 2007). As the R&D 
department of the case company is considered, eight members from this unit were 
selected that are believed to provide a ‘complete picture’ of the phenomenon. It was 
ensured that both a management and a staff view were acquired, whilst a fair 
distribution between employees with short and long tenures was selected. As there are 
16 employees within this department, it is believed that in-depth interviews with eight 
members can provide a fairly reliable portrait as long as the results indicate a high 
degree of alignment between the different views that are obtained.  
3.8 Method for data analysis 
All interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed to verbatim text 
(Saunders, 2007). Subsequently, it was necessary to categorize the transcribed data 
according to the theoretical framework, which means the responses of the interviewees 
are categorized according to the subtopics of interest – a process of unitizing data 
(Saunders, 2007). Through this, it was possible to recognize relationships between the 
different categories (Saunders, 2007).  
3.9 Reflections on research methods 
As a result of the case study set-up, this research will provide a very detailed 
description of the situation at Bona and their corresponding open R&D practices. 
However, investigating one single company and solely concentrating on the situation at 
Bona may restrict the generalizability of the final conclusions. A similar problem may 
arise as the Bona employees served as our primary source of data collection. While it 
was tried to validate essential parts of information by the means of triangulation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007), such measures could not always be taken as little market 
information could be obtained, neither by the means of a desktop research nor by Bona 
itself. Consequently, the study will be heavily influenced by and hence reflective of the 
thoughts and views of the respective eight participants. While the final conclusions may 
not be applicable to organizations operating in different kinds of environmental 
settings, the case study will provide interesting insights into a firm’s R&D 
configuration and its determining factors to companies that work under similar 
organizational conditions in regards to the three identified elements of appropriability, 
competence level and culture, as Bona does.  
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4 Findings 
This chapter describes the empirical research findings. At first, a background of the 
case study company will be given in order to provide a good overview of the firm’s 
historical development and current activities. Subsequently, the company’s R&D 
openness configuration will be depicted by categorizing their open activities according 
to the four identified types of openness. After that, it is described how appropriability, 
competence level and culture influence the configuration of R&D openness. It needs to 
be noted that the findings are at times supplemented with analytical elements. This is 
done so as to better contextually place the findings, which will later facilitate the 
transition towards the analysis. 
4.1 Background of the company: Bona 
Bona AB is a family-owned company that was founded in 1919. Next to its 
headquarters in Sweden, Bona is represented in more than 70 countries around the 
world. Bona’s focus lies with the provision of a full system solution for the 
installation, maintenance and renovation of wooden floors, dividing their business 
portfolio into five segments: sanding, finishing, fastening, maintenance and industrial 
coating. Bona’s customer base consists of three segments: professional floor 
contractors, parquet producers and floor owners. Furthermore, Bona communicates 
innovation to be of great importance to their operations, which is reflected in half of 
their turnover being generated from products launched within the past 5 years.  
Bona operates in the coatings industry, which is a segment of the general chemicals 
industry. This segment is very R&D intensive and technology-driven: after the 
pharmaceutical industry, the coatings industry invests most resources into R&D 
(Rehnberg, 2013b). The fundament of remaining competitive in this industry is the 
R&D function within Bona – five R&D centers collectively generate the demanded 
innovation efforts. This case study focuses on its oldest and most predominant unit: 
R&D Malmö. This R&D department focuses on development of finishes, which 
constitutes Bona’s most profit generating and thus most important segment. For better 
understanding, a brief introduction of this product is provided: a finish is a coating 
product - it is a chemical fluid that is applied on the surface of a wooden floor. After 
the application of a finish, the wet content of a finish will evaporate in the air – and a 
thin protective layer is formed on the floor (Lindell, 2013b). Hence, a finish serves as a 
protective mechanism, while it also beautifies a floor (Rehnberg, 2013b). Eventually, it 
needs to be noticed that finishes development is a highly advanced technological 
endeavor, requiring a high knowledge plateau (Persson, 2013b). 
Historically, R&D Malmö already developed finishes in the 1950’s. However, at this 
point the unit was quite diversified as it developed other wooden floor products, but 
also products for other flooring types and other industries. In 1975, in response to 
growing public environmental concerns, R&D developed a discontinuous innovation: 
waterborne finishes, which were both health and environmentally conscious. This was 
the starting point of a significant growth process for the entire organization – and put a 
stronger strategic emphasis on the finishes department (Persson, 2013b).  
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In 1987, R&D Malmö initiated a project that would become the backbone of Bona’s 
current competitive advantage (Tonell, 2013a; Persson, 2013a). It was felt that the 
dispersions available in the market did not comply with what Bona thought was 
possible in this area. Dispersions are the chemical building blocks of a finish and 
attribute different properties to a finish, like scratch resistance or waterproofness. 
Between 1987 and 1995 the unit managed a backward integration that allowed it to 
develop its own dispersions. This move would soon become Bona’s main tool in 
differentiating themselves from the competition and allow them to develop their future 
competitive advantage. This backward integration allowed them to produce their own 
dispersions and thus being able to act faster and in a more efficient and flexible manner 
while it also provides them with the option to tailor the dispersions to their own unique 
needs (Persson, 2013a). Despite this being an extremely difficult and time-consuming 
initiative, R&D Malmö managed and up until today, no competitor has been able to 
accomplish such backward integration (Persson, 2013b). By pursuing this approach, 
Bona has managed to build a strong market presence with high market shares for the 
greater part of their product portfolio. This business model reconfiguration also 
highlighted R&D Malmö’s gradual process of increasing its focus on finishes 
development for wooden floors – whilst spinning off other activities. This process was 
completed around 1994, when R&D Malmö almost solely focused on finishes 
development – and a process of focus and long-term specialization on finishes started 
that has been going on until today (Persson, 2013b).  
4.2 Configuration of R&D openness 
This paragraph describes in which types of openness R&D Malmö engages as to get a 
good picture of the configuration of Bona’s R&D openness.  
4.2.1 Inbound innovation: sourcing 
Customers (flooring contractors) 
The finishes that R&D Malmö develops are primarily used by professional flooring 
contractors that either install or renovate a wooden floor. R&D incorporates the 
customers in the late stages of product development by jointly testing the innovations 
out in the field. Additionally, customers are an important source of ideas for future 
innovations. Customers cannot give insights into the technology of a finish, but give 
feedback with regards to applied product characteristics, like performance, application 
or viscosity (Rehnberg, 2013a; Persson, 2013b). Hence, flooring contractors play an 
important role in ensuring market-driven innovation. 
Customers (component purchasers) 
Bona has recently engaged in partial commercialization of its technology by selling 
individual components, which is historically not Bona’s end-product: Bona used to 
solely sell an end-product (finishes) which consists of many of these individual 
components. This new endeavor puts R&D in contact with other industries than floor 
coatings alone, like furniture and plastic, which generates non-traditional industry ideas 
that may have value for Bona’s coatings business (finishes) as well (Högvall, 2013).  
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Suppliers 
Although R&D Malmö develops its own dispersions and finishes, it purchases bricks 
from suppliers. As an intentional simplification, a group of bricks form a dispersion, 
and a group of dispersions form a finish. In many occasions, suppliers are in a stage of 
development with regards to a new or improved brick and want to sell it to Bona or 
request Bona to test the brick – and funnel back the test results.  A new brick may 
contain new or better properties and consequently, provides R&D with more enhanced 
tools to innovate (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b). Through these interactions, R&D 
is able to get deep technological insights from suppliers into the bricks. In many 
instances, the testing that Bona does for the suppliers may lead to the unexpected 
discovery of new properties, which the supplier was not aware of and that were not part 
of the properties that were requested to be tested. Hence, these interactions allow for 
extra value creation for Bona. (Rehnberg, 2013a; Fagefors, 2013a). Consequently, 
suppliers have a usefulness in the early stages of R&D’s innovation process, but have 
no value in latter stages (Rehnberg, 2013a). The development (formulation) of a finish 
is something they cannot assist with, because the mixing of components is an 
interrelated activity; component A may give a certain property that the supplier is 
aware of, but when it is mixed with component B, component A may react very 
differently. Other benefits that suppliers offer consist of ideas and industry contacts. 
Hence, suppliers provide early-stage technological resources, ideas and networks 
(Persson, 2013b). 
Trade shows 
R&D scientists visit trade shows through which staff can witness small and big industry 
trends. These events are about scanning the environment and generating ideas, finding 
market opportunities and getting industry contacts that may be valuable in the future. 
Trade shows from other industries are visited as well as this may generate ideas that are 
applicable to Bona’s field as well (Persson, 2013b; Linton, 2013; Tonell, 2013b).  
Environmental agencies 
R&D maintains close relationships with environmental agencies in order to anticipate 
future amendments that may influence Bona’s business. The chemical industry is 
subject to strong environmental and health legislation, which also changes regularly. As 
product development cycles in R&D may take years, it is important for Bona to gather 
information that allows it to predict which compounds to exclude from its finishes 
(Rehnberg, 2013c; Persson, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013; Jens Persson, 2013). Links with 
environmental agencies thus allow more responsiveness to the environment. 
Universities and research bodies 
Bona has a long-standing relationship with the chemistry department of Lund 
University. At first, the majority of the scientists in the R&D department are alumni, 
which makes the university an important supplier of qualified human capital. Several 
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students do their master degree project within Bona, which provides Bona with insights 
into non-core technological areas. Additionally, R&D is able to leverage Lund 
University’s expensive analytical tools and specialized staff that know how to operate 
these instruments. R&D also engages in research projects funded by the European 
Union that, for example, promote the development of greener starting materials. Such 
activities create company awareness in the market place and hence contribute to image 
building. Consequently, universities and research bodies provide Bona with human 
capital, contacts, technological insights into non-core areas, access to expensive capital 
goods, open research publications and public trends (Rehnberg, 2013a; c; Persson, 
2013b; Erkselius, 2013).  
4.2.2 Inbound innovation: acquiring 
Patent-holders 
Sometimes Bona encounters situations in which it develops a component which has 
already been patented by another firm. In principle, it can occur that an external player 
has a patent on a small part of a chemical or a process – which is a fraction of the total 
package of a single product. If the value in using that ‘part’ is significant, Bona 
approaches the patent holder to negotiate a license agreement or Bona simply purchases 
that company’s products if that party’s interest is in selling products with embedded 
technology instead of selling or licensing out technology (Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 
2013b).  
4.2.3 Outbound innovation: revealing 
Customers (flooring contractors) 
Bona wants its customers to be able to offer competitive services in their market. 
Therefore, Bona provides the contractors with best practices training and support, 
which is mainly about successfully applying Bona’s products on the flooring surface. 
By providing such training and support, R&D has a ‘currency’ to source customer ideas 
and feedback (Persson, 2013b). 
Suppliers 
As aforementioned, suppliers play an interesting role in Bona’s R&D practices – more 
innovative input allows more innovative output. When Bona engages in testing of 
newly developed bricks, it reveals parts of the testing results to the supplier as 
‘currency’ for sourcing valuable insights from this supplier. Occasionally, it can also 
happen that Bona has identified a potential innovation for its finishes for which no 
brick exists yet. In such an instance, Bona needs to communicate parts of the 
requirement for a new brick to the supplier and the supplier can use this information to 
develop the innovation that Bona needs as input (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b).  
Universities and research bodies 
Bona provides students with a master degree project – some non-core technological 
knowledge must be shared with the student, while the projects are usually in the range 
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of supporting knowledge. Additionally, some non-core technological knowledge must 
also be shared with the university in order to allow the university staff to successfully 
conduct analytics on the products that Bona provides (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 
2013b). When cooperating in research projects with the research bodies, Bona 
contributes with more general expertise (non-core technological resources) that it has 
obtained due to its experience in the coatings industry (Rehnberg, 2013a; b).  
4.2.4 Outbound innovation: selling 
Customers (component purchasers) 
As aforementioned, R&D has commercialized part of its technology through selling 
individual components, which is mainly based on financial grounds: Bona gets 
financial resources from something that has been predominantly developed for their 
finishes, but is assumed to also be valuable for other industries (Högvall, 2013).  
4.3 Factors influencing the configuration of R&D openness 
4.3.1 Appropriability 
To understand appropriability in Bona’s case, a small introduction to the chemistry of 
their products is necessary. As explained, R&D purchases bricks to formulate a 
dispersion, and by combining a set of dispersions, a finish is formulated (Rehnberg, 
2013b; Persson, 2013b). The quality of the dispersions or finishes is not solely 
dependent on the inclusion of certain components. The real secret behind getting the 
full potential out of a set of chemical components is the formulation – the order and 
process of mixing the compounds (Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013). 
Under normal circumstances, companies can defend their intellectual property by filing 
a patent – and sue offenders for infringement. However, a patent provides very poor 
protection for these process-related products, because it is very difficult to analyze a 
competitor’s product in such an in-depth manner that infringement of a process can be 
proven. Reverse-engineering is ill-suited to determine the formulation process. 
Additionally, it can only reveal the fragments out of which a product is created, but not 
the exact components (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c). Also, reverse-engineering is 
terribly difficult and hence extremely costly (Persson, 2013b; Fagefors, 2013b). Next to 
not being able to police a patent, there is also the issue of having to reveal the 
development process of the innovation if a patent is filed. Generally, only 10% of 
Bona’s output can be protected effectively by a patent. However, as Bona still wants to 
avoid disclosing too much information, they write these patents in a broad and 
complicated way so that it is difficult for patent-readers to really understand the 
development process (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b).  
Outbound innovation: revealing 
Bona’s core competences are based on the technological development of finishes. Due 
to the process-dependence of this activity, patents can only provide little IP protection, 
and hence their core activities are built on secrecy. A cooperation with a competitor 
would therefore be very dangerous, because giving external players insight into 
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‘Bona’s kitchen’ would allow duplication of its competitive advantage, which would be 
fatal as exposure of these secrets is an irreversible process (Rehnberg, 2013b). The 
weak appropriability issue in this area is also displayed in Bona’s interactions with 
suppliers. Bona’s suppliers consist of large chemical companies that also sell their 
products to Bona’s competitors. Thus, Bona needs to be very careful to only 
communicate in general terms as any core technological knowledge that is shared may 
be redistributed by the supplier to its other customers (Fagefors, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b). 
Trivial things, like Bona expressing interest in a supplier’s brick, because it generates a 
property that improves the scratch resistance of a floor coating, can already backfire as 
Bona’s competitors may become aware of this also (Rehnberg, 2013b). This risk is 
exacerbated, because there is high mobility of human capital within this industry 
(Högvall, 2013). Consequently, when suppliers cooperate with Bona in testing a new 
brick, Bona is very selective in the information it funnels back. If unexpected properties 
are discovered, Bona will in most cases keep this information to themselves (Rehnberg, 
2013a; Fagefors, 2013a). Especially when Bona needs to approach a supplier to request 
a specific brick that is not available in the market yet, the interaction process becomes 
very difficult as Bona is forced to disclose at least some requirements (Fagefors, 
2013b). The same accounts for when Bona needs to acquire parts of a patent or obtain 
licenses – the patent holder receives sensitive information that may fall in the wrong 
hands, hence, it needs careful assessment whether the value from the patent or license 
can be foregone on or not (Rehnberg, 2013b). All in all, this transforms outbound 
innovation (revealing) into a very time-consuming, secretive and very political game.  
The weak appropriability issue is also reflected in Bona’s cooperation with universities 
and research bodies. Bona is very careful to never share any core technological 
resources, but contributes with more general knowledge like commoditized non-core 
technological resources that hold no secrets. The knowledge that is revealed to 
customers is not about technology, but about best practices – disclosure of such 
information is not harmful to Bona’s competitive advantage as it is much more 
commoditized and externally available than the technology to develop a finish 
(Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c).  
Outbound innovation: selling 
The appropriability issue is also reflected in Bona’s possibilities to commercialize its 
technology. Within Bona, less than 10% of its inventions can be properly protected by 
a patent, which greatly reduces the potential offer to the market (Persson, 2013b). 
However, Bona did find a way to commercialize some of its technology by selling 
some of their components, which cannot be reverse-engineered by competitors. 
However, the components used in Bona’s most important and technologically advanced 
products are not considered, and prospects are carefully selected. It is ensured that no 
knowledge is shared that could be harmful to the core business (Högvall, 2012).  
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Inbound innovation: sourcing 
In the broad chemical industry there is cooperative R&D and knowledge transferring 
between organizations. However, in Bona’s specific type of industry, the coatings 
segment, this occurs a lot less as competitors experience the same appropriability issues 
as Bona does resulting from dealing with similar products (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 
2013b; Erkselius, 2013). Hence, cooperative R&D between coating industry players 
would impose a high risk of both parties unintentionally exposing their secrets. This 
makes appropriability not just an individual organizational problem, but an industry 
problem that impairs cooperative efforts between industry players in the technological 
area. Industry segments with better appropriability mechanisms are able to open up 
more towards R&D, whilst companies in other segments are more secretive (Högvall, 
2012; Persson, 2013b). Bona’s suppliers usually have effective patent protection or 
they deal with commoditized bricks that hold no secrets. As such chemicals are easy to 
detect through reverse-engineering, the suppliers can easily protect their bricks. 
Therefore, suppliers can be much more open than Bona can be in return as suppliers 
can give risk-free, deep technological insights into their bricks (Rehnberg, 2013a; Jens 
Persson, 2013; Tonell, 2013b).  
Inbound innovation: acquiring 
The same principles as for the aforementioned type of openness apply: R&D’s 
possibilities to source or acquire technology are very limited within its own industry as 
competitors can also not protect their IP other than through secrecy; other industry 
segments such as suppliers, however, may have stronger appropriability mechanisms 
(Persson, 2013b; Högvall, 2013), allowing inbound innovation activities. 
As achieving competitive advantage in Bona’s industry is very dependent on the 
technology that is incorporated into a product, industry players are either secretive if 
appropriability is weak – or have effective patent protection. The supporting resources 
that R&D Malmö obtains from suppliers, customers, trade shows, environmental 
agencies, universities and research bodies do not suffer from appropriability issues, 
because they are patent-protected, contain no secrets, or are not essential to that party’s 
competitive advantage. Alternatively, they are readily available from other parties as 
the knowledge is much commoditized, or the institutions serve a public function. As a 
result, the sharing parties do not need to consider capturing the gains when sharing 
resources rendering appropriability questions as redundant. Bona ‘repays’ these 
organizations with resources that cannot expose any of Bona’s core technological 
resources. 
4.3.2 Competence level 
As R&D Malmö’s core competence is based on the technological development of 
finishes, Bona has established a very high competence level within this area which can 
be demonstrated by various activities. Firstly, R&D Malmö has been involved in 
developing finishes from the 1950’s up until 1994 – when it spun off all other R&D 
activities and solely focused on finishes development. From 1994 up until the present, 
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R&D followed a process of tight focus and long-term specialization on finishes, 
allowing for the building of high competence levels. Further, R&D Malmö was the 
inventor of the waterborne technology for finishes in 1975 – a technology that is still 
applied within the industry. Over the course of the years, R&D Malmö continued to 
introduce breakthrough innovations that are still at the top of the industry, like Bona 
Mega, Traffic, Novia and Traffic HD (Persson, 2013b). This constant launch of 
innovative products indicates that Bona’s competence level is rather high. Also, Bona 
is still the only company in this industry that mastered the competences for a backward 
integration.  
Internally, R&D Malmö is recognized as the R&D center that is most crucial to Bona’s 
competitive advantage, sales and profitability. As a result, it gets most managerial 
attention and resources (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b). Bona’s 
ambition is to be the most innovative company in this industry that provides the best 
products that are also most environmentally conscious. The owner of the company 
specifically addressed that R&D Malmö has failed if it develops “me-too” products, as 
Bona products should be unique. R&D Malmö is adequately funded to support these 
ambitions, demonstrating Bona’s commitment to innovation. (Rehnberg, 2013b; c). 
Beyond, the R&D workforce is characterized by very long tenures, which is important 
in this field as experience is the most crucial factor in mastering finishes development – 
it is so complicated that it requires 2 to 5 years of experience before R&D scientists can 
independently complete a project (Fagefors, 2013b; Linton, 2013; Erkselius, 2013). 
Hence, the workforce is very well educated – R&D scientists generally have either a 
master or a PhD in chemistry before getting employed at Bona. From there, most junior 
scientists are assigned a senior mentor and it is worked on projects cooperatively (Jens 
Persson, 2013; Erkselius, 2013; Fagefors, 2013b).  
The R&D attitude is also characterized by excellence and innovation – scientists have 
the ambition to provide the best products, the most innovative products and the most 
environmentally conscious products (Rehnberg, 2013c; Fagefors, 2013a; b; Jens 
Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013; Erkselius, 2013). R&D has an innovation portfolio that 
includes some long-term projects that run for several years and are aimed at radical 
innovation. Bona is very persistent with this and does not just cease a project if the 
results do not live up to the initial expectations– the goals are changed when the 
underlying assumptions change. Additionally, R&D scientists experience a moderately 
high degree of autonomy in determining how to achieve a goal – and have freedom to 
work on interesting findings that are obtained during a project also (Tonell, 2013b; 
Fagefors, 2013b; Linton, 2013; Erkselius, 2013), allowing to further deepen their 
understanding of interesting outcomes.     
To summarize, the described historical development and organizational practices have 
shaped an environment through which a high competence level within R&D was 
established. The next step is to look at how this competence level relates to Bona’s 
competitors. At first, it needs to be acknowledged that, when considering the broad 
chemical industry, the competences required for developing finishes place such a 
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company already at the higher end of the continuum– the technological entry level to 
compete in Bona’s niche is much higher compared to many other segments (Persson, 
2013b). Bona R&D scientists generally believe that they have the highest competence 
level within their industry niche (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; 
Jens Persson, 2013; Erkselius, 2013). This claim appears well-supported by evidence 
from competitor product analysis: R&D continuously analyzes competitor product 
launches and benchmarks the result against Bona’s own products. According to Bona 
staff, competitors’ products usually excel at one or two product properties but are 
underdeveloped in others. Bona, however, is believed to be the only company that has 
the competences to keep all the properties at a high level (Rehnberg, 2013b; Fagefors, 
2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Erkselius, 2013). This view is shared by the majority of the 
scientists and hence they claim that their finishes are the best available in the market 
place. This attitude also emerges from the fact that Bona’s relatively expensive finishes 
have obtained finishes market leadership in many geographical regions with constant 
market shares between 35 to 40 percent (Bona, 2013b). In addition, Bona scientists 
state that their company is being used in the industry as a benchmark of what is 
possible with regards to technological innovation (Persson, 2013b). Further, many 
external players wish to work with Bona, hence, the market acknowledges Bona’s 
competence level (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c; Tonell, 2013b; Linton, 2013).   
As a good example for Bona’s apparent superior competence level serves an open 
competition with external players to provide an innovative solution to new tightened 
environmental legislation – R&D Malmö came up with a solution way faster than what 
any external party could manage (Högvall, 2013). This example serves as a good 
illustration for Bona’s superior internal innovation competences. This is further proven 
by the number of new product introductions. In the past two years Bona has launched 
significantly more new products than competitors (EHA, 2012). The impressive 
innovation levels of 55 percent and 59 percent of Bona’s gross margin originating from 
new product launches or significant modifications to existing products in 2011 and 
2012 illustrate this point. Although many organizations outsource innovation to realize 
speed and responsiveness, Bona’s superior competence level combined with backward 
integration guarantees speed and responsiveness in NPD. In order to improve a finish, 
Bona can adjust the dispersion within 2 days. Competitors cannot do this themselves 
and are dependent on external parties, which may take 3 to 4 months (Rehnberg, 
2013a).  
Inbound innovation: sourcing 
Most sources that Bona utilizes provide resources in terms of market intelligence, 
ideas, human capital, access to expensive capital goods, application feedback and initial 
stage, non-core technological resources. These are all valuable resources, but they 
hardly relate to R&D’s core competence: the technological development of finishes. 
Although the technological resources from suppliers provide value in the early stages 
of innovation, R&D does not utilize any external sources in the formulation of its 
finishes (Linton, 2013; Persson, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Rehnberg, 2013a). For this, 
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it solely uses its in-house core technological competences. Although staff suggests that 
there is no dogmatic attitude towards OI, there is a moderately strong belief that 
incoming knowledge streams may not add much in its core technological area of 
formulating finishes (Persson, 2013a; Rehnberg, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; Fagefors, 
2013b; Jens Persson, 2013). As explained, analysis of competitor products indicated 
that Bona’s products are technologically superior, which raises questions about how 
much value a cooperation can generate (Rehnberg, 2013b). It was found that R&D 
scientists experience very few knowledge gaps that cannot be solved internally 
(Rehnberg, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; Fagefors, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013). 
R&D Malmö has extreme difficulties to identify potential external partners. It is 
believed that there are not many sources that are knowledgeable about such advanced 
chemistry, especially when discussing the more complex parts.  
However, apart from limited perceived value that can be attained, a high competence 
level may also have strong advantages with regards to inbound innovation. Bona’s 
competence level appears to be an attractive force towards external players, which are 
eager to cooperate with R&D Malmö (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c; Tonell, 
2013b; Linton, 2013). In some cases, this is very interesting: there are instances in 
which suppliers have an advanced innovation (new brick) which generates an advanced 
property, like biodegradability and they contact Bona for testing. The user is required to 
have an advanced skill set if it wants to incorporate such a property in its finishes. Bona 
is then able to assimilate such a brick in its endeavors and benefit from the new 
property (Persson, 2013b). Hence, by having a high competence level in R&D, 
organizations may be well-positioned to make use of advanced innovations by others. 
Through this, the firm with strong R&D capabilities is able to further raise the 
standards of its product, whilst the firm with lesser R&D capabilities cannot 
incorporate such an advanced external innovation within its business – the 
technological gap between both parties is enhanced.  
Inbound innovation: acquiring 
The same principles as for sourcing apply to this type of openness as well.  
Outbound innovation: revealing 
Having a high competence level gives Bona an excellent currency to engage in 
outbound innovation – as many external parties are interested in cooperating with 
Bona. However, concerns were voiced with regards to the knowledge give and get 
tradeoff; it is believed that Bona would contribute more than the external partner with 
R&D eventually educating the other partner to a higher standard without Bona 
receiving anything in return (Rehnberg, 2013a; b; Tonell, 2013b; Linton, 2013).  
Outbound innovation: selling 
The same principles as for the revealing outbound innovation type apply. Bona has a 
great pool of knowledge that is of interest to others (Persson, 2013b). In the case of 
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R&D’s partial commercialization of technological components, Bona’s competence 
level functioned as a strong amplifier – within one year, R&D was able to establish a 
prospect list with 15 to 20 companies – with 5 actual organizations already actively 
purchasing (Högvall, 2013).  
It needs to be acknowledged that the above findings focus on its competences regarding 
its core technological resources. However, organizations can have competence in many 
other areas as well (cost-efficient production, marketing, sales). In Bona’s case, despite 
having such a high competence level with regards to technological development of 
finishes, Bona’s OI practices still allow the company to harvest other resources that are 
valuable contributions to its resource base surrounding its core, like market 
intelligence, ideas, human capital, access to expensive capital goods, application 
feedback and non-core technological resources. To ‘repay’ these inbound practices, 
R&D Malmö shares its non-core technological resources.  
4.3.3 Culture 
R&D Malmö’s culture was explored to assess how well this culture is suited for OI 
practices. At first, it was found that staff is generally employed for a longer time and 
that employee turnover is very low – the workforce composition is very stable as since 
2004 only one R&D scientist left the company (Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b). As 
aforementioned, R&D Malmö has been very successful in terms of supplying Bona 
with the highest-quality, most innovative finishes – which accounts for the bulk of 
Bona’s profits. This success has established a strong sense of pride and 
accomplishment within R&D (Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b; Högvall, 2013; 
Fagefors, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013: Tonell, 2013b). R&D scientists get 
a lot of reinforcement from their interactions with suppliers – as they learn they are 
being benchmarked against in the industry (Persson, 2013b). Apart from the 
technological resources that are collected from suppliers in the initial stages of NPD, 
R&D Malmö is able to do everything itself with regards to the formulation of the 
finishes. Part of the strong pride within R&D is based on the fact that the employees 
perceive that their department hardly needs external technological resources for its 
innovation practices – Bona is very self-sufficient in its core technological area 
(Erkselius, 2013; Högvall, 2013; Fagefors, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Tonell, 2013b; 
Rehnberg, 2013c). This strong R&D attitude has also been confirmed by two non-R&D 
sources (Högvall, 2013; Saalbach, 2013). Coupled with this pride, there appears to be a 
rather high level of confidence amongst R&D staff in their own abilities also (Högvall, 
2013; Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013), although 
some scientists also add some moderation to this as they feel that R&D is also humble 
and is not overconfident (Tonell, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013; Linton, 2013). As is 
elaborated on rather extensively in earlier chapters, R&D staff also appears well aware 
that they develop the best finishes in the industry – the relative performance of external 
technology appears lower.  
R&D scientists describe the culture within R&D as dynamic – due to its 
innovativeness, there is a constant degree of experimentation and change going on 
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(Fagefors, 2013b). Also, there is a high level of interaction between colleagues (Jens 
Persson, 2013) and employees are excited about their jobs as they learn a lot and 
experience personal development (Rehnberg, 2013c). Further, staff is experiencing 
alternation as scientists work on different kinds of projects, however, when doing so 
they remain in their department for finishes (Tonell, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013). Several 
attempts of the vice president of R&D of moving scientists from their “home” 
department to a “foreign” department, for example industrial coating, have failed 
(Persson, 2013). 
In addition, R&D has a culture that is very acceptant of failure – there is no managerial 
punishment or resent amongst colleagues (Rehnberg, 2013c; Fagefors, 2013b; Jens 
Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013; Erkselius, 2013). Beyond, the work culture in R&D 
Malmö is typically described as very informal and cooperative. Teamwork and 
knowledge-sharing is far more valued than superior individual performance. Scientists 
can be as open-minded and honest as possible in this respect (Rehnberg, 2013b; 
Fagefors, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; Jens Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013).  
There have not been many instances in which R&D opened up in its core technological 
field –the need of secrecy is commonly understood. However, there is one well-known 
example within R&D where a supplier was entrusted with an important testing method 
– and betrayed Bona’s confidence by presenting the method at a conference. This 
incident further enforced the secretive attitude within Bona. 
Risk-taking propensity with regards to innovation was confirmed to be positive within 
R&D Malmö. However, risk-taking within an OI culture is also about granting external 
parties responsibility for innovation – and partially giving up control. As R&D Malmö 
has had almost complete control over its innovation practices for such a long time, it 
may be hard for personnel to give up such control. Although some R&D scientists think 
that the R&D attitude towards this issue is positive (Erkselius, 2013; Linton, 2013; Jens 
Persson, 2013) other scientists think that R&D would not be welcoming to such a 
concept (Fagefors, 2013b; Tonell, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c) – and prefer complete 
control. Additionally, R&D is very low risk-taking when it comes to the quality of its 
products (Rehnberg, 2013c; Erkselius, 2013). Innovations are only commercialized if 
they are perfect and flawless (Högvall, 2013) – such an attitude appears to align more 
with maintaining complete control.  
For R&D to involve external players within its core technological area, there should 
also be a clearly identified need. However, R&D staff seems perfectly aware that they 
are the industry leader in terms of innovativeness, quality and environmental concerns. 
When asking R&D scientists about where they see Bona within 10 years, no concerns 
were voiced with regards to not being able to maintain technological leadership. R&D 
staff is very aware of the need to be open to changes in customer demands or legislative 
amendments (disturbances in the external environment), but OI in the core 
technological area was never mentioned (Jens Persson, Fagefors, 2013b; Linton, 2013; 
Rehnberg, 2013c; Tonell, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013). When specifically asked about 
35 
 
whether R&D will maintain their top position through running it in the same way as 
now, R&D staff responded positively (Jens Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013; Rehnberg, 
2013c; Erkselius, 2013). R&D is constantly trying to be open, but at the same time, it is 
not pursued actively enough – and it is realized that R&D could do much better in this 
respect. Hence, it seems there is no apparent need within R&D to pursue a higher 
degree of openness. This is surprising as it is confirmed that there is technology in 
other industry segments that would be of interest to Bona (Persson, 2013b).  
As aforementioned, R&D staff is very aware of the need for secrecy – there is a high 
awareness that revealing core technological resources may reveal secrets that can be 
used against the organization. During the interviews, some scientists feel that 
acceptable risks can be taken with selling technology (Erkselius, 2013), preferably 
when there are high monetary gains and very low risks (Fagefors, 2013b). However, 
other interviewees pointed out that there may also be a fear within R&D that selling 
core technology could strengthen the relative position of competitors by further 
building upon the technology provides by the selling organization and thus deteriorate 
Bona’s competitive position (Högvall, 2013; Jens Persson, 2013; Linton, 2013; Tonell, 
2013b; Rehnberg, 2013c). A first step has been taken with commercializing individual 
components, since the related risks were found to be rather low. The main reason why 
this does not occur more is because Bona can only patent about 10% of their 
technology. Further, uncertainty about the value of those patentable products for 
external parties has been voiced (Rehnberg, 2013b). However, 95% of the shelved 
inventions are not used again – and eventually destroyed (Fagefors, 2013a). It is at least 
questionable to which extent these decisions are based on rational considerations, and 
to which extent the vision is blurred because of ‘fear’. 
Another reason why commercialization of unused products has not been pursued so far 
is that R&D management has simply not thought about this opportunity (Persson, 
2013). As they are doing very well in their core activities, they did not consider 
commercialization activities beyond the core. 
As culture is of such intangible nature, we will not categorize it into the four boxes of 
OI, but instead will only distinguish between inbound and outbound innovation in 
general. 
Inbound innovation – sourcing and acquiring 
As the findings above already suggest, little inbound innovation is to be expected 
within Bona’s R&D department when looking from a cultural perspective. Among 
others factors such as high beliefs in the R&D’s own capabilities as well as considering 
themselves as the market leader combined with high levels of pride of producing 
everything on their own are all attributes for a reluctant attitude towards inbound 
innovation. 
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Outbound innovation – revealing and selling 
Despite shelving 95 percent of Bona’s inventions and seldom using them later for other 
purposes within company walls, little has been done so far to further commercialize 
those ideas. As an underlying reason, R&D’s culture does not seem to be supportive of 
outbound innovation – as a fear within the department was determined with regards to 
allowing competitors to build upon Bona’s technology in order to strengthen their 
position against them. 
The above described OI culture only applies to Bona’s core technological resources. As 
was explained earlier, working with these core technological resources comprises 
R&D’s core competence and generates its competitive advantage. Hence, it can 
reasonably be assumed that the culture is most strongly impacted by R&D’s goings 
with its core technology. Additionally, the appropriability issue and competence level 
also heavily affect R&D’s openness with respect to its core technology, which makes it 
interesting to see how a culture transforms under such conditions. With respect to the 
supporting resources that R&D obtains through its open R&D activities, Bona actually 
cooperates with such external bodies, which indicates a supportive culture towards 
using such resources. The same accounts for the resources that Bona shares – as long as 
it does not concern core technological resources, R&D displays a supporting attitude 
towards sharing knowledge. As the aforementioned findings indicated, R&D does seem 
very aware of the need to be open to disturbances in the market, like changing customer 
needs, different offers that suppliers can make and changing environmental legislation.  
 
5 Analysis and discussion 
In the following chapter the findings of the empirical research are analyzed in regards 
to the main research question. In order to do so, it is firstly pointed out how R&D 
Malmö applies the different types of openness and their resulting benefits. Thereupon, 
it is discussed how each of the three factors identified, appropriability, competence 
level and culture, influence R&D openness. As the findings did not indicate significant 
differences between ‘sourcing’ and ‘acquiring’ (inbound innovation) and ‘revealing’ 
and ‘selling’ (outbound innovation), the analysis mainly distinguishes between inbound 
and outbound innovation.   
5.1 Configuration of R&D openness 
5.1.1 Inbound innovation: sourcing 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) propose that organizations can utilize external sources of 
innovation through leveraging the discoveries of others. Since not all smart people 
work in one company (Chesbrough, 2003a), organizations can access resources through 
external networks and benefit from creative ideas of outsiders (Datta, 2010). Through 
Bona’s interactions with customers, it sources valuable ideas and customer feedback 
that is incorporated in order to ensure more market-driven innovation (Rehnberg, 
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2013a; Persson, 2013b). Several authors indicate that involving customers in 
innovation practices provides organizations with better tools to satisfy the customer 
(Vargo, 2004; Vaisnore and Petraite, 2011) and is significantly related with higher 
levels of innovative sales (Laursen, 2011). The resources that Bona sources with 
suppliers, trade shows, environmental agencies, universities and research bodies mainly 
concern trends and upcoming legislative amendments (Persson, 2013b; Linton, 2013, 
Tonell, 2013b). Through such activities, Bona becomes more responsive to the 
environment, one of the pinnacles of OI (Chesbrough, 1996).  
As Iansiti (1997) proposes, it is virtually impossible for organizations to acquire the 
status of core competence in all of its activities. Through the component selling 
endeavor, R&D also generates ideas from other industries, which aligns with findings 
by Hoffman (2007) that organizations can systematically access resources outside a 
firm’s boundaries. Tapping into the relative strengths of others is also done by R&D 
Malmö when leveraging Lund University’s specialized staff and expensive analytical 
tools to get products analyzed (Rehnberg, 2013c; Persson, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013). 
Further, Bona is able to source technological resources from suppliers required in the 
initial stages of innovation, which allows Bona to capture the value of emerging 
technology (Battistini, 2013; Hoffman, 2007). This constitutes a great benefit as it 
allows deepening of the pool of technological opportunities available to the firm 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
5.1.2 Inbound innovation: acquiring 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) propose that organizations can ‘acquire input to the 
innovation process through the market place’. The main difference between sourcing 
and acquiring is the involvement of financial resources. In this respect Bona engages 
only in the occasional purchase of licenses from patent-holders. This is done when 
R&D unintentionally developed a process or product that has already been patented 
(Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b). 
5.1.3 Outbound innovation: revealing 
Organizations can reveal their resources to external stakeholders for indirect benefits: 
as OI practices are usually transactions, organizations need a ‘currency’ in order to get 
inbound innovation (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). As Henkel (2006) found, 
organizations can selectively reveal innovations in order to get developmental support 
from external players, while the revealing organization gets resources in return. Bona 
provides its customers (flooring contractors) with training and advice on how to apply 
products and through this interaction the organization gets the aforementioned 
customer insights in return. Additionally, R&D Malmö tests suppliers’ products and 
provides them with test results. In this way Bona establishes rapport with these players 
which will eventually lead to suppliers sharing valuable technological insights 
concerning their products in return. In line with Henkel (2006) Bona also sometimes 
has to reveal small pieces of their development process in order for the supplier to 
develop products according to Bona’s needs. The same principle applies to universities 
and research bodies. 
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5.1.4 Outbound innovation: selling 
Dahlander and Gann (2010) argue that this type allows “firms to commercialize their 
technology through selling or licensing out.” In Bona’s case, the company recently 
engaged in partial commercialization of its technology through selling certain 
components (Högvall, 2013). The company benefits from the major imperfections in 
knowledge markets that create opportunities to commercialize technology 
(Lichtenthaler, 2005). Teece (1986), Helfat (2006) and Fosfuri (2006) all propose that 
other parties may have a better infrastructure and commercialization capabilities to 
fully exploit the technology. While this is not necessarily the case with Bona as it 
applies these components in the formulation of its finishes itself, R&D Malmö’s 
initiative aligns more with the notion by Chesbrough (2003a) that external 
commercialization can further exploit the potential of a technological asset.  
The empirical findings identified two different types of resources. The first is defined 
as (1) ‘core knowledge’: the technological resources that Bona uses in the development 
(formulation) of its finishes. This is R&D Malmö’s core competence, and the most 
advanced technological endeavor that is performed within the company, providing a 
competitive advantage in the market place. The findings indicated that Bona is very 
closed within this area - it does not share anything of this with the external environment 
(Rehnberg, 2013b) – apart from the components that are commercialized, which 
happens under strict conditions, so that there is no risk involved. Additionally, no 
components are sold that are used in Bona’s most important and technologically most 
advanced products (Högvall, 2013). Apart from very marginal outbound innovation, 
Bona has no inbound innovation for this activity at all. 
The second type of resources that were identified is defined as (2) ‘supporting 
knowledge’: early-stage technological resources, human capital, access to expensive 
capital goods, and market intelligence (ideas, trends, customer feedback). While these 
are valuable resources, they hardly relate to Bona’s core competence: development 
(formulation) of finishes. Instead, they provide knowledge that surrounds its ‘core 
knowledge’.  
5.2 Appropriability 
5.2.1 Outbound innovation 
Teece (1986) recognizes that organizations that move R&D beyond company walls are 
confronted with threats with regards to capturing the value. This is in accordance with 
Fischer and Henkel (2012), stating that firms that engage in value creation activities 
also need to apply mechanisms to capture the respective value that is created, otherwise 
commercial success may be difficult to achieve. As the findings in chapter four 
indicate, a crucial inhibitor for Bona to engage in outbound OI is the weak 
appropriability of Bona’s technological resources (Rehnberg, 2013b). Considering the 
outbound variants ‘revealing and ‘selling’, it was determined that Bona needs to be 
extremely careful in its interactions and exposure of resources to external players as 
such cooperations may leak sensitive knowledge out of the company. This is 
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particularly important with regards to R&D’s core knowledge, which is most important 
to its competitive advantage, and is largely dependent on company secrets (Persson, 
2013b). Drechsler and Natter (2010) found that organizations without effective IP 
protection tend to engage less in OI. This aligns with Bona’s situation: when opening 
up to the external environment, it does not have such appropriability mechanisms that 
ensure that Bona’s IP is protected and that a reasonable share of the value is captured 
(Rehnberg, 2013b).  
As a way of protecting secrets, patents are available as they grant the holder the 
exclusive right for the particular innovation for a fixed time span. If effective, patents 
prevent imitation by competitors (Fischer and Henkel, 2012), which makes firms more 
likely to engage in OI (Drechsler and Natter, 2012). However, filing a patent requires 
the organization to disclose the composition of its innovation (Erkal, 2005), which 
‘should contain sufficient information to allow a skilled person to reproduce the 
particular innovation’ (Kultti, 2007). Innovators may fear that the information that is 
revealed may be used to the benefit of competitors (Zhang, 20120). As patent 
protection is usually imperfect, organizations also fear that patents will educate 
competitors so that they can find ways to legally invent around the patent (Arundel, 
2001; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). Despite the fact that only 10% of Bona’s 
output can be protected effectively by a patent, the danger of disclosing important 
information is an important consideration that is heavily discussed. In order to avoid 
disclosing too much information, they write these patents in a broad and complicated 
way so that it is difficult for patent-readers to really understand the development 
process (Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b).  
The main issue is that due to the process-dependence of Bona’s product development, 
patents provide very poor protection for its secrets – if a competitor infringes Bona’s 
patent, the firm will most likely not be able to prove this and thus cannot sue the 
offender. If Bona would like to prove patent infringement, it would need to reverse-
engineer a competitor offering and determine that Bona’s process was used. However, 
reverse-engineering cannot fully determine the applied process or exact components 
(Minagawa, 2007; Denicolo, 2004; Persson, 2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b), which means 
the end-product has a degree of inimitability (Barney, 1991; Collis and Montgomery, 
1995) that prevents Bona from proving infringement. Although Bona can get 
reasonably far with reverse-engineering, it also needs to be noted that it is a terribly 
difficult process which requires enormous investments (Persson, 2013b). Hence, in line 
with Dufresne and Offstein (2008), ‘maintaining, guarding, controlling and even 
mainstreaming patents all require investments’ – policing an invention can be a very 
costly endeavor and thus are rather unsuitable for companies of smaller size, such as 
Bona.  
Bona has thus chosen secrecy as its means of IP protection. Research by Cohen, Nelson 
and Walsh (2000) indicates that organizations find secrecy to be the most effective 
appropriability mechanism for the protection of new processes, especially in the 
chemical industries. Yet, they also point out that secrecy lends itself the least to R&D 
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spillovers, making OI rather difficult. Additionally, a secrecy policy provides no legal 
barrier for other organizations to adopt the ‘secret’ in their business practices. Hence, 
secrecy is rather unsuitable for OI practices. As Lane and Wegner (1995) propose, 
‘secrecy is a form of intentional deception or deceptive omission’ – this is a poor base 
from where to engage in cooperation. Hence, organizations that have to operate under 
secrecy have a weak appropriability mechanism for engaging in outbound innovation, 
because it is uncertain if the desired amount of value can be captured (Teece, 1986; 
Helfat, 2006; Fischer and Henkel, 2012). Revealing too many resources may allow 
competitors to duplicate such an organization’s competitive advantage, whilst selling 
technology is impaired as none or few inventions can be patented. Without proper 
protection, it is hard to sell technology as Dahlander and Gann (2010) found that selling 
or licensing out IP forces an organization to disclose some of the details of its invention 
to the potential licensee. These details are necessary for a sales pitch, but the potential 
buyer gets a degree of information for free which may cause this party to ‘act 
opportunistically and steal the idea.’ 
5.2.2 Inbound innovation 
Bona’s inbound innovation practices are also affected by appropriability issues as 
Bona’s entire industry segment needs to operate under conditions of secrecy. This 
greatly limits the potential to engage in cooperation with industry partners, because 
both partners experience high risks of unintentionally revealing their secrets (Persson, 
2013b; Rehnberg, 2013b; Erkselius, 2013). This aligns with findings from Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh (2000) who found that typically industries employ similar 
appropriation mechanisms since industry players deal with comparable products.  
However, as the findings indicate, Bona gets deep technological insights into bricks 
from suppliers, which is only possible because these suppliers do have effective 
appropriation mechanisms (Fischer and Henkel, 2012; Drechsler and Natter, 2012). 
Hence, despite companies (Bona) having weak appropriability mechanisms that 
severely impair outbound innovation practices, such organizations may still benefit 
from inbound innovation practices, especially with organizations that have strong 
appropriability mechanisms. Consequently, organizations that suffer from weak 
appropriability in some area of their business can evaluate and pinpoint specific areas 
within their business in which appropriability is either strong or not an issue. Through 
this, they can use knowledge that is not harmful to their competitive advantage as a 
‘currency’ (Dahlander and Gann, 2010) to take in knowledge from the external 
environment. In Bona’s case, the company is very secretive about its core knowledge, 
but tries to offer non-core technological resources in order to take in knowledge from 
the environment.  
5.3 Competence level 
5.3.1 Inbound innovation 
The inbound innovation types of ‘sourcing’ and ‘acquiring’, are characterized by 
internalizing external knowledge. In order to do so successfully firms need to display 
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high levels of absorptive capacity (Zahra and George, 2002). Strong in-house R&D 
competence levels have been identified as prerequisite for absorptive capacity, ‘the 
ability to recognize value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). While absorptive capacity is largely a 
function of the firm’s level of prior knowledge, Schmidt (2010) found that absorptive 
capacity is cumulative and continuous R&D activities were found to be very significant 
in building absorptive capacity. As elaborated on in chapter four, it can be expected 
that R&D Malmö has built a very high competence level with regards to development 
of its core product. Considering that R&D Malmö has been developing finishes since 
1950, it can be assumed that they satisfy Sanchez’ (1997) and Gupta’s (2009) 
requirements of core competences needing to develop over time and cumulatively, 
allowing for consolidation of its competence level and the incorporation of 
organizational learning (Persson, 2013b). The internal environment also seems suitable 
to establish a high competence level in R&D: staff indicated that the atmosphere is very 
informal and heavily emphasizes knowledge sharing, which are two attributes that are 
significantly related to building competence (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Zahra and George (2002) provide a more detailed definition by arguing that absorptive 
capacity is a “dynamic capability that influences the firm's ability to create and deploy 
the knowledge necessary to build other organizational capabilities”, categorizing the 
process into two stages: potential absorptive capacity including knowledge acquisition 
and assimilation, and realized absorptive capacity represented by transformation and 
exploitation. While Bona seems to satisfy the pre-requisites of strong in-house R&D 
capabilities needed for high absorptive capacity according to Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990), they encounter severe problems in the first stage of absorptive capacity: partner 
identification and acquisition. According to Zahra and George (2002) this step “refers 
to a firm's capability to identify and acquire externally generated knowledge that is 
critical to its operations”. As the vice president of R&D Nils-Erik Persson stated “It is 
extremely complicated to get good OI collaborations in regards to the chemical side of 
the business. This is because there are not many people that are knowledgeable in this 
field and if they are, where can we find them? I would say that we need to learn a lot to 
ask the right questions – to find those to talk to”. Hence, despite a high competence 
level in its core segment of finishes, it is not enough to establish high absorptive 
capacity. Clausen (2013) examined the relationship between absorptive capacity and a 
firms’ ability to enter into innovation cooperation with external actors. The findings of 
this study suggest that internal R&D, combined with training and an educated 
workforce constitute key elements of a firm’s absorptive capacity which are “driving 
forces behind a firms’ ability to have innovation cooperation with a breadth of actors 
external to the firm” (Clausen, 2013). As illustrated in chapter four, R&D scientists 
generally hold a master degree of a PhD in chemistry, while junior scientists go through 
a long training route during which they are assisted by a senior mentor. Consequently, 
even though Bona applies all measures suggested by Clausen (2013) their partner 
identification activities are still hampered. Hence, other factors need to be at play when 
determining a firm’s ability to find the right OI partners. In this context the eleven year 
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older study by Zahra and George (2002) seems to offer more explanatory evidence to 
the factors that determine successful partner identification. They in particular refer to 
intensity and speed as determining elements stating that “the intensity and speed of a 
firm's efforts to identify and gather knowledge can determine the quality of a firm's 
acquisition capabilities” (Kim, 1997a,b; Zahra and George, 2002). This finding 
pinpoints Bona’s weakness in this respect: they lack speed and intensity in pursuing OI 
in this segment, as their high competence level dilutes their perceived value that 
external partners can deliver. Consequently, a high competence level is positively 
related to absorptive capacity and the engagement in OI initiatives, however it seems 
that there is a certain threshold of competence level that eventually hinders the 
establishment of absorptive capacity, thus making such organizations refrain from 
inbound innovation. Barge-Gil (2010) approaches this matter in a similar way by 
stating that “R&D intensive firms are likely to have great capacity to absorb external 
knowledge, but their need for it is usually smaller”. As a result they exploit it “but it is 
not at the core of their innovation assets” (Barge-Gil, 2010). This portrays Bona’s OI 
efforts quite well. While they do not engage in OI within their competitive advantage 
area of technological development of finishes, they actively seek for OI activities 
outside this segment. As the R&D scientists generally do not think that open R&D in 
the core knowledge area will add much value, the partner identification stage of 
absorptive capacity does not receive enough support. As a result, high competence 
organizations run the risk that they may not perceive the necessity to engage more in 
inbound innovation, leading to the identification stage of absorptive capacity remaining 
underdeveloped. 
This thinking, however, is a fallacy as the literature suggests that even though 
organizations have very strong R&D capabilities, their innovative performance still 
increases if they involve external actors within their innovation practices (Berchicci, 
2013). It is true that the stronger an organization’s R&D capabilities, the higher the risk 
to seize substitutive resources – every firm approaches a threshold of optimal 
performance, after which involving more external actors lowers innovative 
performance, and this threshold is closer-by for high competence firms (Berchicci, 
2013). However, as R&D Malmö has completely sealed its core knowledge area, there 
is definitely potential to increase innovative performance.  
However, advantages of having a high competence level in R&D in regards to inbound 
innovation can be identified as well. As the findings in chapter four illustrate, R&D 
Malmö’s high competence level appears to attract external players. Hence, in line with 
Drechsler and Natter (2012) who observed a similar relationship in their research, high 
competence organizations appear more trustworthy and attractive to work with. 
Additionally, whilst the initial stage of R&D Malmö’s absorptive capacity appears 
underdeveloped, the unit is very adept at assimilating and exploiting early-stage 
technological resources that it gets ‘handed’ by its suppliers. Hence, by having a high 
competence level, and thus having a strong ability to assimilate and exploit external 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), firms may be better positioned to make use of 
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advanced innovations by others – as was observed when Bona seamlessly integrates 
advanced bricks into its innovation practices. This finding is supported by many other 
researches (Lin, 2012; Hagedoorn, 2012; Caloghirou, 2004; Berchicci, 2013). Through 
this, the high competence level organization is able to further raise the standards of its 
product – and the technological gap between the focal company and the weaker 
organizations is enhanced.  
5.3.2 Outbound innovation 
With regards to outbound innovation in the form of “revealing and selling”, a clear 
advantage of having a high competence level is that a firm has an excellent ‘currency’ 
to engage in open R&D (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). With regards to Bona’s 
component selling endeavor, it was clearly identified that the market place was well 
aware of its high-quality image – and demand for the components is high. At the same 
time, the outbound innovation of “revealing” may be hampered, because the high-
competent organization may give more resources than it would eventually receive in 
return. Hence, the tradeoff between taking in and giving out resources may be 
unreasonable, which in turn may diminish the value for the high competence 
organization to engage in outbound innovation. 
Concluding, Bona has built significant competence within its core knowledge area – 
development of finishes. As Iansiti (1997) proposes, it is virtually impossible for 
organizations to acquire the status of core competence in all of its activities. Hence, 
Bona does actively use open R&D to tap into the relative strengths of external players 
to take in supporting resources that are valuable contributions surrounding its core 
competence, like market intelligence, early-stage technological resources and access to 
expensive capital goods and qualified human capital. Hence, whilst companies may 
perceive less value in open R&D for their core competence as they perform very well 
in this area, other parts of their business in which it has less competence may be 
supplemented with OI initiatives so that the company reaches acceptable levels in these 
respects also (Hoffman, 2007; Chesbrough, 2003a, Brez, 2009, Lichtenthaler, 2011).  
5.4 Culture 
Organizational culture is defined as ‘a collection of values, beliefs and norms shared by 
its members and reflected in organizational practices and goals’ (Hofstede et al., 1990; 
Khazanchi et al., 2007). As Herzog (2011) and Kuratko (2011) argue, cultural values 
have an emotional attachment that can deviate from rational economic considerations. 
The amorphous nature makes culture hard to pinpoint, but it transcends every aspect of 
an organization. Martins and Terblanche (2003) and Ahmed (1998) argue that cultures 
may contribute to the occurrence of innovation, but may also be an inhibitor. Herzog 
(2011) proposes that ‘organizations that move from closed to OI practices need a 
change in the underlying innovation culture’ indicating that an OI culture needs to have 
different characteristics than a closed innovation culture. In many instances, 
organizations fail to cycle from closed innovation to successful OI practices, because 
the culture is subject to ‘the not-invented-here syndrome’ for inbound innovation 
activities (Katz and Allen, 1982; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Veugelers, 1999; 
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Mehrwald, 1999; Di Minin et al., 2010; Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006) or ‘the not-
sold-here syndrome’ for outbound innovation (Herzog, 2011). The organizational 
antecedents of such cultural phenomena were investigated within Bona – and are 
compared to the literature. 
5.4.1 Inbound innovation 
At first, it was found that, in general, R&D staff has very long tenures and employee 
turnover is very low (Rehnberg, 2013b; Persson, 2013b). According to Katz and Allen 
(1982), this is dangerous as their research indicated ‘a tendency of a group of stable 
composition to believe it possesses a monopoly of knowledge in its field, which leads it 
to reject new ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment of its performance.’ 
Therefore, stable group compositions fuel NIH-syndrome.    
The findings from chapter four also revealed a strong sense of pride and 
accomplishment within R&D Malmö, which was mostly based on their self-image of 
self-sufficiency in its core technological area. Additionally, a high degree of trust in 
one’s own technological competence was identified. Slowinski et al. (2009) argue that 
R&D scientists may resist sourcing innovation as they want to focus on technological 
discoveries, instead of acting as an integrator of external technology. If R&D Malmö is 
very accustomed to in-house R&D, and is proud of this as well, it can well be that 
external R&D is perceived as violation of their own identity, which triggers NIH-
syndrome (Herzog, 2011). As Mehrwald (1999) proposes, a high degree of trust in 
one’s own technological competence is another contributing factor to NIH-syndrome. 
In the observed case, it is uncertain to which extent this fuels NIH-syndrome, but 
strong confidence in general may tend to alter the opinion an individual has concerning 
the usefulness of other knowledge sources. 
Herzog (2011) also proposes that individuals tend to create a stable working 
environment (routines) for stress and uncertainty reduction, which fosters the 
establishment of NIH-syndrome as involving external R&D partners increases 
dynamism and uncertainty. The findings in chapter four indicated that the work place 
within R&D Malmö is rather dynamic, yet only in their own department. Moving 
scientists to other areas within the organization encountered resistance, indicating 
symptoms of an NIH-syndrome. 
In this context Herzog (2011) also argues that negative or no experiences at all with 
technology sourcing may create a negative bias towards OI. As was found in chapter 
four, R&D Malmö is very self-sufficient and closed with regards to its core activity. At 
the same time, there is a well-known example of betrayal within R&D that further 
enforced the secretive atmosphere within the company (Tonell, 2013b). Hence, the 
limited experience in open R&D with regards to the technological area, and the 
prominent example of betrayal, do not indicate good prerequisites for further opening 
up R&D, while this may simultaneously cultivate NIH-syndrome.  
It was also advocated that OI cultures require a higher risk-taking propensity (Herzog, 
2011). Chapter four’s findings indicated that R&D Malmö takes substantial risks with 
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regards to realizing more radical innovations. However, risk-taking in OI is more about 
granting external parties responsibility for innovation and partially giving up control 
(Herzog, 2011). In this context, it was indicated that there is dissension amongst staff 
about whether R&D would be welcoming to a concept of assuming such responsibility 
to external parties – and giving up control. Additionally, R&D was found to be very 
low risk-taking with regards to the quality of its product (Rehnberg, 2013c; Erkselius, 
2013) as innovations are only commercialized if they are perfect and flawless (Högvall, 
2013). Such a perfection syndrome (Kuratko, 2011) aligns more with an attitude of 
maintaining complete control, indicating that R&D Malmö’s culture appears to be 
reluctant in terms of open innovation activities. 
In this regard Mehrwald (1999) also argues that the relative performance of external 
technology influences the proneness of an R&D department to adopt a NIH-syndrome. 
The findings from chapter four clearly indicated that the R&D scientists believe that 
they have the best finishes within the industry, an attitude that fosters the establishment 
of a NIH-syndrome.  
The findings from chapter four further indicated that R&D scientists seem perfectly 
aware that they are the leading company in terms of innovativeness, quality and 
environmental concerns. Additionally, it is believed that Bona will continue its 
technological leadership within 10 years also – without changing the way R&D is 
currently managed. It was also acknowledged that R&D does not pursue OI actively 
enough and that it could do much better in this respect. Hence, there seems to be no 
apparent need to pursue a higher degree of openness. Gilbert (2005), Chesbrough and 
Crowther (2006) argue that a strong perception of threat or a clear articulation of the 
necessity to be open is essential to create commitment to OI. Within Bona, there seems 
to be an absence of such a need. Without such a need, staff may not perceive the benefit 
of OI, which again fuels NIH-syndrome.  
Therefore, with regards to the inbound innovation practices of ‘sourcing’ and 
‘acquiring’, R&D Malmö displays many organizational antecedents that can lead to the 
development of a NIH-syndrome – which the academic literature describes as a 
powerful inhibiter of OI (Herzog, 2011; Mehrwald, 1999; Di Minin et al., 2010; Katz 
and Allen, 1982; Veugelers, 1999). Due to culture’s amorphous, complex and 
intangible nature, it cannot be determined exactly how far the influence of culture goes 
with respect to Bona’s inbound innovation practices – and if there really is a NIH-
syndrome. However, as many organizational antecedents are in place, it can reasonably 
be assumed that R&D Malmö’s culture is not suitable to inbound OI practices in its 
core competences. Hence, other factors than rational economic considerations play a 
role here (Herzog, 2011; Kuratko, 2011). Behavior-wise, it speaks for itself that R&D 
has completely sealed its core knowledge area for inbound innovation. The earlier 
findings that R&D Malmö’s inbound innovation practices are to a high extent inhibited 
by the belief that there is no value or clearly identified need, due to its high competence 
level, are very interesting in this context. As culture is not solely based on objective 
considerations, it can well be that NIH-syndrome exacerbates the influences that more 
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rational considerations impose. In Bona’s case, despite having a high competence level, 
there may be valuable external resources that add to its core knowledge, however, a 
strong identity and pride of doing R&D on their own, very limited or negative 
experiences with open R&D, a strong need for control (low risk), high confidence in 
one’s own abilities, the relative performance of external technology being regarded as 
inferior and the lack of a clearly identified need may all severely bias the reality. 
Hence, cultural factors seem to distort reality and this may affect inbound innovation, 
whilst there may be rational potential to benefit from external technology. As a result, 
organizations need to continuously ‘assess’ their culture and determine whether such 
influences do not bias inbound innovation activities, by for example, bringing in 
outsiders that have not been exposed to Bona’s culture. Although culture is dynamic, it 
is also not easily changeable. For example, if a new leader is appointed that is very 
supportive of OI, it may take several years for that leader to change the organization’s 
culture (Kuratko 2011). Hence, the cultural change cycles are longer than for other 
organizational practices that can be changed quickly – meaning while the organization 
or the environment is supportive of open R&D practices, it can be that the culture has 
not cycled to such a stage yet.  
5.4.2 Outbound innovation 
With regards to the outbound innovation types of ‘revealing and ‘selling’, chapter four 
reported that R&D scientists display a high awareness of the need for secrecy when 
engaging in external interactions. Additionally, a lot of interviewees believe that the 
R&D culture houses a fear that selling technology could strengthen the relative position 
of competitors by allowing them to further build upon the technology that is provided. 
Hence, it is most likely that the weak appropriability of Bona’s core knowledge area 
has played an essential role in creating this fear, as culture is again an outcome of 
organizational practices (operating under secrecy). According to Herzog (2011), NIH-
syndrome and NSH-syndrome originate from approximately the same sources. Hence, 
again, competence level will play a part in the outbound innovation practices also: part 
of the fear may originate from the finding that staff perceives their technology as 
superior, which means there is much to lose when opening up. As Herzog (2011) 
argues, the ‘systematic overestimation of the negative outcomes of external technology 
commercialization’ is a strong antecedent of the NSH-syndrome. A secretive R&D 
environment and a high competence level may instigate a fear that externalizing 
technology may backfire on an organization’s competitive position, and hence, NSH-
syndrome may bias the rational perception of the employees within a firm.  
As so many antecedents of NSH-syndrome were identified, it can reasonably be 
assumed that cultural factors are at play. Especially the finding from chapter four that 
95 percent of Bona’s inventions are not commercialized makes it questionable whether 
these inventions really render no commercial value – or if more cultural aspects 
underlie this opinion. Hence, it is possible that an NSH-syndrome distorts reality and 
this may affect outbound openness decisions in R&D. Especially since the NIH and the 
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NSH syndrome originate from largely equivalent sources, such cultural influences will 
play a role in both inbound and outbound practices.  
Despite R&D Malmö being quite closed within its core knowledge area, the findings 
from chapter four indicated that R&D scientists do understand the importance of 
incorporating supporting external resources within its innovation practices, like market 
intelligence, human capital, access to expensive capital goods and non-core 
technological resources – as the company actively takes these resources in from the 
external environment, whilst ‘paying’ for them by sharing its own supporting resources. 
Hence, R&D’s culture seems more of a barrier towards complementing its core 
competence (finishes development) with external technological resources, but its 
culture seems supportive of sharing supporting resources. As was illustrated, a culture 
is affected by organizational factors like weak appropriability and a high competence 
level – and how the firm deals with these. As there are no appropriability issues with 
such resources, and Bona does not hold its core competence in such areas, the culture 
may also incorporate much more of a positive attitude towards utilizing supporting 
resources. Hence, organizations may display different ‘sub-cultures’ with regards to the 
business areas they deal with. They may be very adept and proud of their secretive core 
– and keep this closed. At the same time, they may have different areas in which they 
have less competence, and that are not affected by appropriability issues, which fuel a 
much more positive attitude towards open R&D cooperations in these areas.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paragraph, final conclusions from our analysis are drawn. After that, the 
limitations of this study are described – and interesting areas for future research are 
indicated. Finally, the practical implications to business managers are highlighted. 
6.1 Conclusions 
Through the analysis of the findings, it was at first indicated that organizations can 
have a different configuration of openness with regards to the different areas that R&D 
engages in – or the different resources that an R&D department deals with. The case 
study indicated that the focal company displayed a different configuration of R&D 
openness for its (1) core knowledge and for (2) supporting knowledge. This is an 
interesting finding as it emphasizes that an R&D department can be divided into several 
business areas – organizations can then determine per business area or resource class 
which openness configuration best contributes to their innovative performance. It was 
found that inbound R&D activities may allow organizations to take in a variety of 
resources, mainly related to technology, market intelligence, human capital, and access 
to expensive capital goods, which in turn filled knowledge gaps and enhanced 
responsiveness to the external environment. In return, outbound innovation gives 
organizations a currency for inbound innovation – and may also allow 
commercialization of technology that brings in financial resources.  
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Appropriability appeared to be both a driver and an inhibitor of open R&D. Weak 
formal IP protection forces organizations to adopt secrecy as its appropriability 
mechanism, which lends itself the least to open R&D. Hence, firms that are dependent 
on secrecy may experience severe difficulties in realizing outbound innovation. 
Opposed to this, there are no formal constraints for such firms to realize inbound 
innovation. It was found that inbound innovation within a focal company’s own 
industry is cumbersome as appropriability was found to be an industry problem, but 
cooperation with industry segments with stronger appropriability mechanisms is a 
suitable option. The secretive firm then needs to determine in which business areas or 
resource classes appropriability is not an issue – and such resources may be used as a 
currency, if not financial resources (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). For the case company, 
its core knowledge area is dependent on secrecy, but it does share its supporting 
resources (which cannot hurt its competitive advantage) and through this is able to take 
in many external resources. The external parties through which it gets its supporting 
resources have no appropriability issues – and were able to share a relatively high 
degree of knowledge. 
Competence level was also found to be both a driver and an inhibitor of open R&D. For 
inbound innovation, a high competence level in a business field or resource class first 
of all works as an attractive force in a sense that external actors are more willing to 
cooperate with the focal company. Additionally, a high competence level establishes 
high absorptive capacity to assimilate and exploit knowledge from external parties. The 
case company was able to integrate advanced innovations from its suppliers into its 
practices, which enlarged the technological gap with lower-competence organizations. 
As a clear downside, a high competence level may ‘blur’ a firm’s vision as no necessity 
for inbound innovation is detected. Through this, the initial stage of absorptive capacity 
(partner identification) may be impaired – and the focal company foregoes on the 
possibilities of inbound innovation and the corresponding vast pool of knowledge 
externally available. For outbound innovation, a high competence level gives a 
company an excellent currency to engage in open R&D, but there is a clear trade-off 
issue: the high-competent firm may give more resources than it gets in return – and 
may educate the other party to a significant standard. As a firm cannot obtain the status 
of core competence in all of its business areas or resource classes, inbound innovation 
allows an organization to complement the areas in which it has a weaker competence 
level with external knowledge – so that these areas can also be improved to a higher 
level.  
Finally, culture was found to be more of an outcome of the aforementioned two factors 
– but proved to be a significant influence that organizations have to consider. Hence, 
the contextual factors cannot be seen solely independently, but they are inter-twined. A 
high competence level in an area may contaminate a firm with the not-invented-here 
syndrome, as staff may perceive that there is no value in and no necessity for inbound 
innovation. A high competence level in combination with a secrecy policy (weak 
appropriability) may infect an organization with the not-sold-here syndrome, as staff 
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may fear that their technology may allow its competitors to strengthen their competitive 
position against the revealing or selling firm – outbound innovation may then be 
impaired. However, as a firm can display different configurations in different business 
areas and resource classes, it was noticed that the case company displayed a much more 
open attitude towards giving and taking in supportive resources, like market 
intelligence. As these supporting resources have no appropriability issues and are not 
the focal company’s core competence, staff displayed a much more supportive culture 
towards inbound and outbound innovation in this area. Hence, an organization may also 
display different ‘subcultures’ with regards to open innovation in different business 
areas and resource classes.  
Finally, the case company showed a high commitment towards internal innovation, 
their OI activities, however, varied from open in supporting and completely closed in 
core knowledge areas. Consequently, it needs to be acknowledged that a company 
being dedicated to innovation does not necessarily mean that they are susceptible to OI 
measures. Displaying a great infrastructure for internal innovation can hence not be 
taken for granted as an entry for OI initiatives. 
6.2 Contribution to literature 
Currently, there is a gap in academic literature in regards to providing better insights on 
the different combinations of openness within a firm and how certain factors influence 
such a configuration, hence our research question aims to address this issue: “How does 
a firm configure its R&D openness and how is this influenced by the factors of 
appropriability, competence level and culture?” The analysis, discussion and 
conclusion have further developed our academic understanding of how a firm’s R&D 
openness configuration is explained by the influences of appropriability, competence 
level and culture. It is a further step in enhancing our knowledge about understanding a 
firm’s R&D openness decisions by zooming in on openness and, instead of talking 
about openness in general, conceptualizing it in a framework of four different types. 
Additionally, this research has integrated culture as an influential factor in 
understanding a firm’s openness decisions – whilst it was also found that culture is 
heavily influenced by the contextual factors appropriability and competence level. 
Consequently, since to the author’s knowledge, these three contextual factors have 
never been related to the four identified types of OI, this study contributes to literature. 
Further new insights are provided in regards to the appropriability mechanism of 
secrecy and how this impairs OI activities. 
6.3 Limitations and implications for future research 
At first, it is to be acknowledged that no research is complete. As this was a case study, 
empirical findings are mainly retrieved from a single entity: the focal organization. The 
conclusions from this research can thus be supplemented in follow-up researches by 
investigating other contextual factors. Additionally, the conclusions may be tested in 
deductive, quantitative studies to determine if they hold true amongst larger 
populations – and can be generalized from. As the case company was able to employ its 
high competence level in order to realize outbound innovation without sharing its core 
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knowledge (suppliers bricks are analyzed using Bona’s core competence; the results are 
funneled back without revealing how it was tested), it would be interesting to see how 
organizations with a low competence level engage in open R&D. Another interesting 
research area would be to investigate the relationship factor within R&D openness 
settings: if a party suffers from weak appropriability, how can strong relationships aid 
in overcoming this – how can organizations rely on an intangible concept like ‘trust’? 
Further, a very interesting area for future research is proposed in studying the 
interrelatedness of all three factors that were found to influence the configuration of 
R&D openness. Whilst beyond the scope of this research, some interesting theoretical 
assumptions are made – that may be interesting for future research. For example, weak 
appropriability as an industry problem forces organizations to be secretive – and hence, 
they have to build significant competence in this area by themselves to become 
competitive (high competence level), which in turn may fuel a NIH and NSH-syndrome 
as it is believed that the organization already controls the best resources. Additionally, 
since appropriability was found to be an industry problem, it puts higher demands on a 
company’s absorptive capacity as a firm needs to look beyond industry borders for 
resources. Consequently, the value of a company’s high competence level may be 
diminished due to industry appropriability issues. Hence, to fully understand a firm’s 
openness decisions, it may be necessary to investigate the interrelatedness of the drivers 
and inhibiters of open R&D.  
6.4 Implications to managers 
Our analysis indicated that being ill-suited for open R&D in one area does not 
necessarily mean that a firm’s R&D department should be completely closed. To the 
contrary, organizations may still be able to reap OI benefits in other areas that are better 
suited for such practices. As core knowledge may need to be shielded, supporting 
knowledge can be greatly enhanced by OI activities – the case company gratefully 
imported and exported supporting resources, whilst keeping its core closed. 
Organizations need to carefully determine how well each area fares with regards to 
appropriability and competence level – and adapt its OI strategy accordingly. 
Appropriability may expose a company’s secrets and allow duplication of its 
competitive advantage – this should be regarded very seriously before opening up 
R&D. Additionally, whilst a high competence level was found to arouse interest in 
cooperation from outsiders, and put the company in a good position to assimilate and 
exploit knowledge, it may also impair the identification stage of absorptive capacity. It 
is also important to see these factors in relation to the culture that resides within an 
R&D department – and is affected by such concepts. Culture transcends all aspects of 
the business, has deep roots, changes slowly and may bias the rationality of R&D 
openness decisions. Hence, organizations are advised to use the conceptual framework 
that was created by merging the Dahlander and Gann (2010) model with the concepts 
of competence level, appropriability and culture – and determine their desired 
configuration before actually engaging in open R&D.   
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Interview participants 
Nils-Erik Persson – Vice-President of R&D 
Nicola Rehnberg – R&D manager 
Lars Högvall – R&D component selling director 
Patrik Tonell – R&D chemist advanced 
Johan Fagefors – R&D chemist advanced 
Stefan Erkselius – R&D chemist 
Jens Persson – R&D chemist 
Peter Linton – R&D chemist 
 
8.2 Interview guide 
1. How long have you worked at Bona? 
2. How did the R&D finishes department build up their current competence level?  
3. What has been the historical position of R&D finishes? How has this department 
contributed to Bona’s competitive advantage? 
4. How is the organizational commitment towards R&D finishes?  
5. How do you use external sources within your daily activities in R&D? 
6. Does R&D finishes ever reveal internal resources to the external environment?  
7. Does R&D finishes ever commercialize internal resources through selling or 
licensing out? For example, you have made a new discovery for which you have no 
use, and thus, sell it to someone 
8. Does R&D finishes ever use external sources of innovation? For example, by using 
ideas, knowledge and technologies that are externally available? 
9. Does R&D finishes ever acquire inventions by paying money for it?  
10. Have you ever had negative experiences with opening up R&D? 
11. How dynamic has the market been? For example, has the way that you develop a 
finish drastically changed over the years? Did R&D finishes have to look into many 
other fields during the years or were they relatively focused on exploiting your 
current competitive advantage?  
12. Does that ever inhibit you to engage in innovation? 
13. Technology push or market pull? 
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14. How is the competence level in R&D finishes? How does this competence level 
relate to your competitors? 
15. Do you think there is value for Bona in opening up R&D activities? Do you think 
you can learn from others? 
16. Can you think of anything that would be valuable to open up? 
17. How do you think the tradeoff between getting and giving knowledge? 
18. Do you think there is a need for you to further open up your R&D and utilize more 
external resources? What about the chemical side? 
19. Which level of education do R&D scientists need to complete? How much training 
do you get internally? 
20. How would you describe the culture within R&D? 
21. Is there a strong sense of pride and accomplishment due to its success? 
22. Is part of this pride, because you are so self-sufficient within your core knowledge? 
23. How do flooring contractors perceive Bona in the market? Do you have a reputation 
in the market for doing things on your own? 
24. How confident is the R&D department in its abilities? 
25. What attitude does R&D have with respect to risk-taking in product development? 
26. What attitude does R&D have with respect to risk-taking when it would come to 
giving external players responsibility for parts of R&D? 
27. How do you deal with failure? 
28. How stable is the R&D environment here? With this I mean, is there a high 
standardization of tasks? Is there a lot of uncertainty involved in the daily tasks of 
scientists? Are jobs very structured or do you have a lot of freedom to decide what 
you do on the job?  
29. How is the relative performance of your finishes in the market? 
30. Concerning selling technology, do you think that there may be a fear in R&D that 
competitors will strengthen their relative position by further building upon the 
technology that you provide? 
31. What’s your ambition within R&D? 
32. Do you ever experience knowledge gaps? How do you go about solving these? 
33. Where do you see Bona in 10 years? Which position will you have in the market? 
 
 
 
 
 
